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ABSTRACT
Labor union membership in the United States has grown more 
rapidly than both the labor force and nonagricultural employment since 
1900. A number of writers have sought to explain the growth behavior 
of union membership which, though it has been impressive in the long 
run, is characterized by spurts of growth with intermittent slow 
growth and even declines. There is wide agreement that the sporadic 
growth of the past has resulted from wars and periods of social 
unrest, with some writers adding union leadership as a third explana­
tory factor. However, there is polarization of opinion concerning the 
future growth of union membership. Some writers expect the secular 
advance to continue and regard the slow growth of membership since 
1954 (and relative decline as a percentage of employment) as tempo­
rary. Other writers, who have been labelled "the saturationists" 
argue that the relative decline since 1954 is symptomatic of a crisis 
for organized labor because, in their view, it is due to unfavorable 
structural changes in employment.
The saturationists claim that unions have penetrated the most 
easily organized areas— male, blue-collar employees working for the 
most part for large firms in the manufacturing, mining, construction, 
and transportation sectors and located in the larger urban centers of 
the East, East North Central, and far West regions. Unions now face 
the more difficult task of organizing the female, nonproduction workers
v
in'small firms, in small towns, in the South and in the service produc­
ing sectors of the economy. Furthermore, these latter categories of 
workers are growing more rapidly than those categories which have been 
the traditional sources of membership.
The claim that the largely unorganized categories of workers 
are less amenable to unionization is crucial to the saturationists’ 
explanation of the recent relative decline of membership and to their 
predilections of crisis. This study subjects three of the key satura- 
tionist arguments to empirical evaluation using data for the period 
1958-1968. The three arguments are:
1) The decline in the ratio of membership to total employment is
directly related to the relative shift of employment into the
less unionized sectors of employment and away from the more 
unionized sectors.
2) The decline in the ratio of membership to employment in those
sectors where unions are strongest is directly related to the
relative decline of production workers and the relative 
increase of white-collar and service workers.
3) The decline in the ratio of membership to employment is
directly related to the geographical shift of employment out 
of the East and East North Central and into the South where 
unions are less successful.
The first claim is found to be plausible in light of the 
results of a shift-share analysis of sectoral employment. However, 
the same results suggest that-this factor is less important to the 
relative decline of membership than the failure of unions in the more 
unionized sectors to grow apace with employment in those sectors.
Both correlation and shift-share analyses of sectoral changes in 
production-worker employment, total employment, and union membership
vi
indicate little basis for expecting membership to be more closely 
related to changes in production-worker employment than to changes in 
total employment (including white-collar and service workers).
Finally, there does appear to be a significant correlation between the 
sectoral shifts of employment to the South and the slow growth of 
union membership. However, employment has also been shifting to the 
Pacific region where union membership is a higher percentage of employ­
ment than in the East and East North Central regions. Thus, the geo­
graphical shifts of employment are an indecisive factor in the decline 
of the organization ratio for the nation as a whole.
In conclusion, the relative decline in union membership that 
occurred between 1958 and 1968 must be largely attributable to factors' 
other than the three examined here. These arguments of the saturation­
ists are not sufficient to explain the recent relative decline of mem­
bership and are a questionable basis for predicting the stagnation or 




Although the American trade union and its precursors date from 
colonial times, the development of unions was fragmentary and sporadic 
until the end of the nineteenth century. Leo Wolman estimated that in 
1900 there were less than 900,000 union members in the United States.^- 
This membership was only 3.0 per cent of the civilian labor force and . 
6.1 per cent of total-nonagricultural employment.  ^ The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics has estimated that by 1968 there were 18,916,000 union mem­
bers in the United States--more than twenty-one times as many as the
O
1900 figure. It is more significant that union membership grew faster 
than either the civilian labor force or nonagricultural employment. 
Membership in 1968 was 23.0 per cent of the civilian labor force and 
27.9 per cent of total nonagricultural employment.^ This long-run 
growth was not the result of steady expansion but of short-run spurts of
^Leo Wolman, Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism (New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1936), p. 16.
^Leo Troy, "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," Review of Eco­
nomics and Statistics. XLVII (February, 1965), 94.
3
U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook 
of Labor Statistics 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), p. 339. (Hereinafter cited as: U.S. Department of Labor,
Handbook 1970.)
^Ibid. See below, Table 1, p„ 9.
2growth which outweighed the intermittent periods of slow growth, stag­
nation, and even decline in membership. The most dramatic growth in 
this long period occurred during the two decades, 1933-1954, following 
the abrupt change in public policy toward unions which culminated in 
the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Along with 
the impressive growth in union membership organized labor also acquired 
power and influence in the economic structure of the nation as well as 
in the political arena.
After 1954 membership declined for several years and then 
resumed its growth but at a slower rate than nonagricultural employ­
ment, so that membership continued to decline relative to employment. 
JThe absolute and relative decline following 1954 is not so important 
because of its magnitude but because it inspired controversial and 
opposing viewpoints about the causes of the decline and its meaning 
for the future of the labor movement.
Several students of the U.S. labor movement have suggested 
explanations for the secular growth of union membership and for the 
short-run deviations from the long-run trend of slow growth.'* One 
group of writers described the decline following 1954 as another
^In addition to those cited in the following two footnotes, 
mention should be made of John R. Commons and Helen L. Sumner, A Docu­
mentary History of American Industrial Society (Glendale, Calif.: 
Arthur H. Clark Co., 1910), V; Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the 
United Stafes (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1921); and Joseph
Shister, "The Logic of Union Growth," Journal of Political Economy.
LXI (October, 1953), 413-33.
3£
temporary lull in the secular advance of the labor movement. They 
predicted a renewal of more rapid growth with the advent of propitious 
short-run conditions.
However, other students of labor began to predict a secular 
decline in the relative strength of the labor movement.^ As early as 
1950 the editors of Fortune predicted that union organizing would 
thereafter be a difficult task.® By the 1960s many writers were say­
ing that the union movement is at a crossroads, and that concerted, 
sustained effort is required to prevent permanent stagnation or even 
decline in the relative size of organized labor. In a survey of union 
leaders and staff published in 1963 there was significant agreement 
with these statements: a state of crisis exists, organized labor has
®See, for example, Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," 
American Economic Review, XLIV (June, 1954), 318; Philip Taft, "Is 
There a Crisis in the Labor Movement? No," in The Crisis in the Ameri­
can Trade-Union Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and Albert Blum, The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCL 
(Philadelphia: November, 1963), p. 11.
^See Joseph Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: 
Thrust or Drift?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XVII (July, 
1967), 578-601; "The Outlook for Union Growth," in The Crisis in the 
American Trade-Union Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and Albert Blum, 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 350 (Philadelphia; November, 1963), pp. 55-62; Edward Townsend,
"Is There a Crisis in the American Trade Union Movement? Yes," in 
The Crisis in the American Trade-Union Movement, pp. 1-9; Albert A. 
Blum, "Labor at the Crossroads," Harvard Business Review, XLII (July- 
August, 1964), 6-8; and Solomon Barkin, The Decline of the Labor 
Movement and What Can Be Done About It, a report to the Center for the 
Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Barbara, Calif.: The Fund for
the Republic Inc., 1961), p. 6. (Hereinafter cited as The Decline of 
the Labor Movement.)
^"Obstacles to Future Union Growth," Fortune. XLI (April, 
1950), 51-54.
4suffered a damaging loss of vitality, and collective bargaining power
9is growing weaker. Most respondents disagreed with the statement 
that "the prospects are bright and future secure." One union presi­
dent professed to fear the " . . .  eventual elimination of unions as a 
force in the economy . . . "  and one staff member answered, " . . .  
there is little in sight to suggest that labor's difficulties can be 
met and overcome.
By far the most compelling evidence of crisis in the eyes of 
most of these writers was the decline, both absolute and relative, of 
union membership after 1954. It must be recognized that union member­
ship is not a perfect index of the strength of the trade union move­
ment. At any given time this measure may give an erroneous impression 
of the bargaining strength of unions, of their performance with 
respect to serving their members, or of the internal stability or 
political effectiveness of unions. For example, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reported in 1969 that although bargaining elections had 
been won in recent years in textile plants in the South few collective 
bargaining agreements were signed.^ However, it seems reasonable to
9
Solomon Barkin and Albert A. Blum, "Is There a Crisis in the 
American Trade-Union Movement?--The Trade Unionists' Views," in The 
Crisis in the American Trade-Union Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and 
Albert A. Blum, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 350 (Philadelphia; November, 1963), pp. 16-24.
10Ibid., p. 17.
■^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor 
in the Textile and Apparel Industries, Bulletin #1635 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 43.
5assume a high correlation between membership and the other factors
which describe the viability of the union movement. Solomon Barkin
stated the case well.
Union leaders know that an institution that does not grow tends to 
stagnate and atrophy, and that the trade union movement cannot 
adequately serve its following if it is not expanding. . . .  It 
must constantly seek to capture the leadership of new unorganized 
groups in order to maintain the buoyancy of social leadership, the 
role of.innovator in working conditions and employee benefits, and 
the position of social and industrial critic to which it is
committed.12
Furthermore, there is really no statistical substitute for membership 
in attempting to gauge union growth.
The various obstacles to future union membership growth which 
have been cited in the literature fall into three categories. First, 
some writers refer to factors within the labor movement itself, citing
a loss of crusading spirit and revolutionary vitality on the part of
13the leadership, and growing apathy if not alienation on the part of 
their constituents.-^ Second, others cite a growing public hostility 
to unions which is reflected in less favorable legislative treatment
12^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 6.
l^See Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," p. 59; Blum, 
"Labor at the Crossroads," p. 6; Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Move­
ment, p. 25; and Barkin and Blum, "Is There a Crisis in the American 
Trade-Union Movement?--The Trade Unionists' Views," p. 20.
■^See Townsend, "Is There a Crisis in the American Trade-Union 
Movement? Yes," p. 2; Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p.
16; George Strauss, "Union Bargaining Strength: Goliath or Paper
Tiger?" in The Crisis in the American Trade-Union Movement, ed. by 
Barkin and Blum, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 350 (Philadelphia; November, 1963), pp. 89-90.
6and perhaps also has encouraged stronger opposition on the part of
m a n a g e m e n t . A  third general class of suggested obstacles arises
from the observation that structural changes in the economy have
shifted employment from sectors or areas of traditional union strength
16to sectors or areas in which unions have been traditionally weak.
The purpose of this dissertation is to test some of the hypo­
theses comprising the third group of obstacles, specifically that slow 
growth in union membership may be attributed to changes in the indus­
trial composition of employment, to the relative decline of production 
worker employment, to the geographical shifts of employment to the 
South. The students who advanced these reasons for the decline in 
membership strength offered only the most casual empirical support for 
their claims when any was offered at all. The tools that are employed 
are quite simple: an adaptation of the shift-share analysis used in
■'•■’See Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, pp. 26-29; and 
Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," pp. 61-62.
^See Barkin, ibid.. pp. 30-52; Joseph Shister, "The Direction 
of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust or Drift?" Industrial and Labor Rela­
tions Review, XX (July, 1967), 578-601; "Obstacles to Future Union 
Growth," Fortune, pp. 51-54; Everett M. Kassalow, "Occupational Fron­
tiers of Trade Unionism in the United States," Industrial Relations 
Research Association, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting 
(Madison, Wis., I960), pp. 166-82; Ray Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic 
Minorities: Unions' Future or Unrecruitable?" in The Crisis in the
American Trade-Union Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and Albert Blum, 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 350 (Philadelphia; November, 1963), pp. 63-73; Benjamin Solomon 
and Robert K. Burns, "Unionization of White-Collar Employees: Extent,
Potential and Implications," Journal of Business, XXXVI (April, 1963), 
160-65; Robert K. Burns, "Unionization of the White-Collar Worker," 
Readings in Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, ed. by Joseph 
Shister (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1951), pp. 56-66.
7regional economics supplemented by rank correlation. The data used 
are subject to certain limitations, as discussed in Chapter IV, but 
are sufficient for the purposes at hand.
The growth experience of the U.S. labor movement is presented 
in some detail in Chapter II, both in its long-run and short-run 
aspects. The explanations for this growth which have been offered by 
various students of the labor movement are presented along with the 
data. Chapter III focuses on those structural changes in employment 
which have been cited as barriers to future growth by some writers. 
Chapter IV describes the data and tools to be used in testing some of 
those structural barrier explanations. The description and results of 
empirical tests of those explanations are presented in Chapter V along 
with the conclusions that can be drawn from the results.
CHAPTER II
THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZED LABOR
The Secular Growth of Union Membership
The overall growth of union membership since the turn of the 
century is impressive, although there have been some periods of stag­
nation and even of decline. Table 1 shows that membership in unions 
of national scope increased from 447,000 in 1897 to 18,916,000 by 
1968. This forty-twofold increase is equivalent to a cumulative 
annual growth rate of approximately 5.4 per cent. As indicated in 
Table 1, most of the growth came in relatively shortjspurts. Member­
ship advanced by varying amounts for a majority of the seventy-two 
years covered, but the data show declines for twenty-eight years.
Perhaps a more meaningful datum for describing the growth of
>■
union strength is the extent of organization, i.e., the proportion of 
eligible employees, or potential members, who are union members. The 
term "real membership" is commonly applied to the proportion of the 
potential which is organized. Several concepts of potential member­
ship have been employed in the literature for calculating real member- 
ship, two of which are incorporated in Table 1.
^Nonagricultural employment was used by Wolman to measure the 
extent of organization in his pathbreaking Ebb and Flow in Trade Union­
ism (ibid., pp. 110-25). Both nonagricultural employment and the 
civilian labor force were used by Irving Bernstein and Leo Troy for
8
TABLE 1




Membership as a Percentage of
Year
Membership3








Employment3Number Change Number Change
(000's) (000's) (Per Cent) (Per Cent) (000's) (000's) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
1897 447 d d 3.5 1916 2,773 +  190 6.9 11.2
1898 501 + 54 d 3.9 1917 3,061 +  289 7.5 12.0
1899 611 +  110 d 4.4 1918 3,467 + 406 8.4 13.5
1900 869 +  258 3.0 6.1 1919 4,125 + 658 10.0 16.0
1901 1,125 + 256 3.8 7.4 1920 5,048 + 923 12.0 18.5
1902 1,376 + 251 4.5 8.4 1921 4,781 - 267 11.3 19.6
1903 1,914 + 538 6.0 11.3 1922 4,027 - 754 9.4 15.6
1904 2,073 + 159 6.4 12.3 1923 3,622 - 405 8.3 12.8
1905 2,022 - 50 6.0 11.2 1924 3,536 - 86 7.9 12.6
1906 1,907 - 115 5.5 10.0 1925 3,519 - 17 7.8 12.2
1907 2,080 + 173 5.8 10.6 1926 3,502 - 17 7.6 11.7
1908 2,131 + 50 5.8 11.3 1927 3,547 +  44 7.6 11.8
1909 2,006 - 125 5.4 9.9 1928 3,480 - 67 7.3 11.6
1910 2,141 + 135 5.6 10.2 1929 3,443 - 37 7.0 11.0
1911 2,343 + 203 6.1 10.9 1930 3,393 - 50 6.8 11.5
1912 2,452 + 109 6.3 11.0 1931 3,358 - 35 6.7 12.6
1913 2,716 +  264 6.9 11.9 1932 3,144 - 214 6.2 13.3
1914 2,687 - 29 6.8 12.0 1933 2,973 - 171 5.8 12.5
1915 2,583 - 105 6.4 11.5 1934 3,609 + 636 6.9 13.9
aLeo Troy, "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," Review of Economics and Statistics. XLVII (February, 1965), Tables 1 and 2, pp. 93-94. The 
last five entries of the last column were calculated from Troy's data.






Membership as a Percentage of
Year
Membership0








Employment0Number Change Number Change
(000's) (000's) (Per Cent) (Per Cent) (000's) (000's) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
1930 3,401 d 6.8 11.6 1950 14,267 15 22.3 31.5
1931 3,310 - 91 6.5 12.4 1951 15,946 + 1,679 24.5 33.3
1932 3,050 - 260 6.0 12.9 1952 15,892 - 54 24.2 32.5
1933 2,689 - 361 5.2 11.3 1953 16,948 + 1,056 25.5 33.7
1934 3,088 + 399 5.9 11.9 1954 17,022 + 74 25.4 34.7
1935 3,584 + 496 6.7 13.2 1955 16,802 - 220 24.7 33.2
1936 3,989 + 405 7.4 13.7 1956 17,490 + 688 25.2 33.4
1937 7,001 + 3 012 12.9 22.6 1957 17,369 - 121 24.9 32.8
1938 8,034 + 1 033 14.6 27.5 1958 17,029 - 340 24.2 33.2
1939 8,763 + 729 15.8 28.6 1959 17,117 + 88 24.1 32.1
1940 8,717 - 46 15.5 26.9 1960 17,049 - 68 23.6 31.4
1941 10,201 + 1 484 17.7 27.9 1961 16,303 - 746 22.3 30.2
1942 10,380 + 179 17.2 25.9 1962 16,586 + 283 22.6 29.8
1943 13,213 + 2 833 20.5 31.1 1963 16,524 - 62 22.2 29.2
1944 14,146 + 933 21.4 33.8 1964 16,841 + 317 22.2 28.9
1945 14,322 + 176 21.9 35.5 1965 17,299 + 458 22.4 28.4
1946 14,395 + 73 23.6 34.5 1966 17,940 + 641 22.7 28.1
1947 14,787 + 392 23.9 33.7 1967 18,367 + 427 22.7 28.0
1948 14,319 - 468 23.1 31.9 1968 18,916 + 549 23.0 27.9
1949 14,282 - 37 22.7 32.6
cU.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook of Labor Statistics 1970, Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C .: Government Printing Office,
1970), p. 339. Canadian membership is excluded.




As a proportion of the civilian labor force, union membership 
grew from 3.0 per cent in 1900 to a peak of 25.5 per cent in 1953.
Thus, the proportion of the labor force which is organized grew by a 
multiple of eight from its 1900 level to its peak in 1953. Since non­
agricultural employment^is necessarily smaller than the labor force, 
membership as a proportion of nonagricultural employment is always 
larger than membership as a proportion of the labor force. In 1900 
union membership was 6.1 per cent of total nonagricultural employment, 
and in its peak year, 1945, this proportion was 35.5 per cent. Between 
1900 and 1945 there was a sixfold increase in the proportion of non­
agricultural employment that is organized and a sevenfold increase in 
the proportion of the labor force that is organized. The divergent
measures of relative strength. See Bernstein, '.'The Growth of American 
Unions," American Economic Review, XLIV (June, 1954), 303; and "The 
Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," Labor History, II (Spring, 1961), 
134. See also, Leo Troy, "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, XLVII (February, 1965), 94-95. As Troy 
points out (ibid.), there are some in the labor force who are not, 
practically speaking, potential union members. Specifically, we should 
exclude all those who are proprietors or managers, most of the self- 
employed, and persons in certain occupat ions which are considered to 
be beyond the domain of unionism, e.g., private household workers and 
many professionals. Benjamin Solomon deducted most of those groups 
from the civilian labor force to arrive at his measure of the union 
potential in "Dimensions of Union Growth," Industrial and Labor Rela­
tions Review, IX (July, 1956), 544-46. In a study limited to manufac­
turing industries, Ferguson and Stober used the number of production 
workers as a gauge of the extent of organization. See C. E. Ferguson 
and W. J. Stober, "Estimates of Union Membership from Reports Filed 
Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act," The Southern 
Economic Journal. XXXIII (October, 1966), 174. The nonagricultural 
employment data used in Table 1 do not include proprietors, the self- 
employed, unpaid family workers, or domestic workers in households.
See U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook 1970, p. 4.
12
growth in the ratios is due to the more rapid growth of nonagricultu­
ral employment (which reflects the decline in agricultural employment).
Proposed Explanations of Secular Growth
In spite of some periods in which union membership declined 
the important point is that the membership of labor unions has grown 
substantially over the last seventy years, both in absolute numbers 
and as a proportion of the labor force and nonagricultural employment. 
A number of writers have sought to explain the emergence of trade 
unions, but only a few have attempted to explain the growth of the 
union movement. Three in particular have contributed explanations for 
membership growth: Horace B. Davis, John T. Dunlop, and Irving
Bernstein."* Bernstein and Dunlop have contributed the most comprehen­
sive explanations for the secular growth of membership, and all three
o
See, for example, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democ­
racy (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1897); and also their History
of Trade Unionism (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1894); Frank
Tannenbaum, The Labor Movement, Its Conservative Functions and Social 
Consequences (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921); Robert F. Hoxie,
Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: D. Appleton and Co.,
1921); Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: Mac­
millan Co., 1928); John R. Commons and Helen L. Sumner, A Documentary 
History of American Industrial Society (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H.
Clark Co., 1910), V; John R. Commons, History of Labor in the United 
States (New York: Macmillan Co., 1918), I; and Joseph Shister, "The
Logic of Union Growth," Journal of Political Economy, LXI (October, 
1953), 413-33.
^See Horace B. Davis, "The Theory of Union Growth," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, LV (August, 1941), 611-33; John T. Dunlop, "The 
Development of Labor Organization," in Insights into Labor Issues, ed. 
by Joseph Shister and Richard A. Lester (New York: Macmillan, 1948),
pp. 163-93; and Irving Bernstein, :The Growth of American Unions," 
American Economic Review, XLIV (June, 1954), 301-18.
13
men have contributed to the explanations of short-run variations about 
the secular trend.
After delineating necessary conditions for the emergence of 
unionism,^ Dunlop suggested two broad environmental factors as deter­
minants of long-run growth: the community institutions embodied in
the legal system, the educational system, the communication media, the 
economic system and political organizations; and the value judgments 
and mores that permeate the society.-*
Bernstein summarized the factors which explain secular growth 
under four headings: the growth of the labor force and employment;
the growing acceptability of unionism; the increased homogeneity of 
the labor force; and the spread of union security agreements.
Bernstein observed the slow but steady growth of the labor 
force, and the concomitant growth of employment, and postulated: "Even
if nothing else were at work, one would expect the labor movement to 
expand at this slow rate."^ He did not explain this relationship any 
more than to say that the growth of employment expands the potential
^Dunlop's necessary conditions are: (1) that the workers must
occupy a strategic position in the technological or market structures, 
for otherwise they have little power to back up their demands; and 
(2) the workers must view their status as wage earners as being perma­
nent, for otherwise they may not view their grievances as permanent. 
Ibid., pp. 182-83.
^Dunlop, ibid., pp. 184-89.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," pp. 313-14.
^Irving Bernstein, "Forces Affecting the Growth of the Ameri­
can Labor Movement," in Labor in a Changing America, ed. by William 
Haber (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 126.
14
for union membership, by which he meant a related growth in employment. 
A strict interpretation of his statement would tell us to look for a 
parametric ratio between membership and employment. There is nothing 
inherent in the expansion of the labor force which will cause union 
membership to expand at the same rate, i.e., to maintain a constant 
proportion organized. Indeed, the figures in Table 1 indicate any­
thing but constancy in the proportion of either the labor force or 
nonagricultural employment that is organized. At best the expansion 
of employment is a permissive factor, allowing membership expansion if 
causative factors so dictate.
Bernstein assumed a secular proportionality between growth in 
the labor force and growth in employment. Dunlop refined this point 
by pointing to the historical novelty of the high proportion of wage 
or salary earners in the labor force.® Modern technology and the busi­
ness corporation have gradually produced a new American society which, 
unlike the past, is largely made up of wage and salary earners. Prior
o
to this transformation, most of the population was self-employed. As 
the labor force has come to be composed of a majority of wage earners, 
workers have come to accept the high probability of remaining a wage 
earner. According to Dunlop, one of the conditions for the emergence 
and growth of unions is that the worker must feel that his role as an
O
Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organization," pp. 185-86.
^Stanley Lebergott, "The Pattern of Employment Since 1800," in 
American Economic History, ed. by Seymour E. Harris (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 290-92 and n. 26, p. 307.
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employee Is permanent, and that present conditions are not transitory 
so that he will be willing to attempt remedial action for grievances. 
Thus, whereas Bernstein assumed a close relationship, ovei time,
between the labor force and changes in the number employed, Dunlop
\
pointed out the newness of this relationship and its expansionary 
effect on unionization.
The second factor which Bernstein suggests is important in the 
long-run growth of unions is the gradual acceptance of unionism in 
American society, especially among employees.^ It is not easy to 
separate cause and effect in assessing this factor, because the growth 
of unions could in itself help improve public attitudes toward unions. 
Unionism may be more acceptable today at least partly because it has 
grown and is now a familiar institution. It has spread without wreck­
ing the system as its opponents had alleged. On the other hand, a 
more favorable public attitude towards unions helps reduce the 
obstacles to union organizing and improves the chances of union growth.
Dunlop apparently agrees that there has been a long-run
improvement in the acceptability of unionism. Dunlop explained the
erstwhile hostility toward unionism as a phenomenon of the prevailing
system of values in the American society.
Professor Schlesinger has summarized the traditional attributes 
of the American most noted by foreign observers: "a belief in the
universal obligation to work; the urge, to move about; a high
^Although casual observation would tend to support Bernstein's 
claim that unions have become more acceptable over the years, there is 
no documentation of such a trend in the literature, and Bernstein does 
not offer any.
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standard of comfort for the average man; an absence of permanent 
class barriers; the neglect of abstract thinking and of the aes­
thetic side of life . . . "  Many of these characteristics are to 
be traced to the "long apprenticeship to the soil."
It should not be hard to understand why labor organization 
would be difficult in a day in which men believed that individual 
advancement was to be achieved solely by work, where leisure was a 
vice, where economic destiny depended solely upon one's ability to 
work and save, where poverty could only be the reward for sloth, 
where the poor deserved their fate, and where the public care of 
the impoverished was regarded as encouragement of idleness.
• • •
One possible gauge of public opinion is public policy. Yet, 
this indicator gives unclear and even contradictory evidence. Public 
policy is reflected in the actions of all three branches of govern­
ment, and the three branches have frequently been in disagreement as 
to the appropriate approach toward unionism. The courts were gener­
ally hostile toward unions prior to the 1930s. The Congress, however, 
provided favorable legislation for railroad unions as early as 1888* 
and the Erdman Act of 1898 provided for mediation and voluntary arbi­
tration of labor disputes and prohibited discrimination against union 
members and the use of yellow-dog contracts on the railroads.^ Fur­
thermore, between 1890 and 1925 at least thirty-three states passed 
laws designed to protect unions from various anti-union tactics used 
by employers to oppose organization, such as the use of injunctions,
Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organization," pp. 186-87. 
The Schlesinger quotation is from Arthur Meier Schlesinger, "What Then 
Is the American, This New Man," American Historical Review, XLVIII 
(January, 1943), pp. 3-4.
12Allan M. Cartter and F. Ray Marshall, Labor Economics (Home­
wood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 386.
17
13yellow-dog contracts and blacklisting. However, it was not until 
the New Deal era, and the reversal of the position held by the Supreme 
Court that these acts were interpreted by the courts in a manner favor­
able to unions.
The reputation of unions is not untarnished, of course. The 
movement has suffered from public reaction to Communist influence 
among the leadership, corrupt leaders, featherbedding and other poli­
cies which reduce productivity and efficiency, emergency strikes, 
revelations of undemocratic practices within the unions, and infla­
tionary wage demands. ^  Employers bolster the negative image and 
plead for government sanctions in dealing with u n i o n s . ^  Solomon 
Barkin speculates that the public is troubled by the costliness of 
conflict and concerned with the possibility of mutually beneficial 
arrangements between unions and large employers at the expense of the 
public interest.^
An important consequence of the image of powerful, undemo-* 
cratic, corrupt and irresponsible unionism has been the legislation 
which has arisen to control the union movement, e.g., the Taft-Hartley 
Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and the
13Ibid.. p .  387.
^See, for example, the reprint of articles from the Wall 
Street Journal in A History of Organized Felony and Folly: The Record
of Union Labor in Crime and Economics (New York: The Wall Street
Journal, 1923).
■^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 62.
16Ibid.
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right-to-work laws in some states. Public-spirited concern was 
buttressed, no doubt, by powerful lobbying on the part of employers. 
Opinions differ as to how effectively this legislation has restrained 
the growth of union membership. Barkin states that the laws have been 
a serious impediment to new organizational gains. According to him 
the Taft-Hartley Act was " . . .  offered to the public as a means to 
curb union bargaining power, to protect the individual's rights against 
union pressure, and to secure legal equality between unions and manage­
ment. But its major consequence has been to hamper the growth of 
union organization."-^ Not only were structural and procedural 
changes made in the way the National Labor Relations Board is to 
administer the National Labor Relations Act, but the Board's jurisdic­
tion was curtailed. Perhaps most important of all, the act and its 
publicity left the impression that unions are undesirable and do not 
represent the true interests of the workers.
Ray Marshall disagrees with Barkin as to the severity of the 
impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on union organization. Marshall's 
position is that it has undoubtedly helped employers oppose unions, 
but it has been exaggerated as a factor influencing union growth.
1^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 20.
18Ray Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities: Unions'
Future or Unrequitable?" in The Crisis in the American Trade-Union 
Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and Albert Blum, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 350 (Philadel­
phia; November, 1963), p. 72.
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It is probably true, then, that there is greater public 
acceptance of unionism today than existed in the fledgling years of 
the movement, and this acceptance has undoubtedly helped union member­
ship, although by an indeterminate amount. On the other hand, the 
public may have replaced its ideological objection to unions with 
other negative attitudes which are largely born of specific instances. 
Unionization has been legitimized, which is partly responsible for its 
long-run growth, but it has been subjected to controls from government. 
The controls and the reasons which prompted them may have slowed 
organization to some extent. Bernstein argued that on balance union­
ism is accepted more readily now. He noted that the Teamsters' union 
suffered most from the exposures of the McClellan Committee, and yet
their membership actually expanded during and after that period when
19other unions were declining.
A third factor which Bernstein credited with promoting the 
long-run growth of American unions is the growing homogeneity of the 
American labor force. He argued that the maintenance of cultural and 
ethnic distinctions, including language, impedes unionization; smooth­
ing out these differences enhances the unionization effort.^® Accord­
ing to Bernstein, language barriers limit the effectiveness of union 
organizers and, along with cultural distinctiveness, limit the accepta­
bility of these workers to the existing, English-speaking union
l^Irving Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945- 
1960," Labor History. II, No. 2 (1961), 157.
20Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 314.
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members. In addition, immigrant groups and racial minority groups
have been used by employers as strike breakers which impaired the
acceptability of those groups to existing union members.
The fourth and final factor in Bernstein's analysis of long-
run growth in union membership is the spread of union security clauses.
Where such agreements are in force a long-run increase in employment
21results in an equivalent increase in union membership.
Short-run Variations in Union Membership Growth
The secular growth of union membership described by the data 
in Table 1 is marked by considerable variety in short-run behavior. 
Table 2 describes the short-run periods of growth. The longer period 
may be appropriately separated into two sub-periods: 1897-1933 and 
1934-1968. The data are taken from two different sources which over­
lap around this division point. The end of the first sub-period 
coincides with the end of the most severe retrenchment in union mem­
bership of the entire survey period, and the beginning of the second 
sub-period is approximately contemporaneous with the beginning of the 
most impressive of the periods of growth. This separation also marks 
the turning point in the federal government's interest in labor prob­
lems and protection of organization rights.
The generally upward long-run movement was interrupted twelve 











Number of Years and 
Cumulative Annual 
Growth Rate
(000's) Years Growth Rate
1898-1904 + 1,626 363.8% of 1897 7 years at +
S'S•CM
1905-1906 - 166 - 8.0% of 1904 2 - 4.1%
1907-1909 + 99 5.2% of 1906 3 + 1.7%
1910-1913 + 710 35.4% of 1909 4 + 7.9%
1914-1915 - 133 - 4.9% of 1913 2 - 2.5%
1916-1920 + 2,465 95.4% of 1915 5 + 14.3%
1921-1923 _ 1,426 - 28.2% of 1920 3 10.5%
1924-1931 - 264 - 7.3% of 1923 8 - 0.9%
1932-1933 - 385 - 11.5% of 1931 2 - 5.9%
(1921-1933) (- 2,075) (- 41.1% of 1920) (13) (- 4.0%)
1934-1944 + 11,457 426.1% of 1933 11 + 16.3%
1945-1947 + 641 4.5% of 1944 3 + 1.5%
(1934-1947) (+ 12,098) (449.9% of 1933) (14) (+ 12.9%)
1948-1950 - 520 - 3.5% of 1947 3 - 1.2%
1951-1953 + 2,681 18.8% of 1950 3 + 5.9%
1954-1956 + 542 3.2% of 1953 3 + 1.1%
1957-1963 • 966 - 5.5% of 1956 7 0.8%
1964-1968 + 2,392 14.5% of 1963 5 + 2.7%
(1898-1968) (+ 18,469) (4,131.8% of 1897) (71) (+ 5.4%)
Calculated from Table 1, using Part A of Table 1 for 1897 through 
1933 and Part B of Table 1 for 1934 through 1968.
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the year-to-yfear changes varied enormously, both in absolute and per­
centage terms.
i
Membership actually declined in 28 (39 per cent) of the 72 
years covered by the data. Most of these years of decline, and all of 
those which were most severe in magnitude, occurred in the years 
before 1934. There were 17 years of decline between 1897 and 1934. 
Twelve of these occurred in one extended period of contraction lasting 
from 1921 through 1933, during which membership fell by about
2,075,000, or 41 per cent of the 1920 total. The largest reduction in 
any single year was the loss of 754,000 members in 1922, which repre­
sented 15.8 per cent of the 1921 total.
In contrast, the most significant period of decline after 1934 
was from 1957 through 1963. During that period the overall decline 
was less than in 1921-33,--966,000,--and the percentage decline was 
much less, only 5.5 per cent of the 1956 total. The absolute loss in 
1961 was almost as large as that in 1922 (746,000 compared to 754,000),- 
but by 1961 the membership base was much larger and the percentage 
change for that year was only 4.4 per cent. The two periods of 
decline 1921-1933 and 1957-1963 account for most (17) of the 28 years 
of membership decline since 1897.
Within these longer periods of decline there are shorter 
periods with significant differences in both absolute and relative 
membership losses. Over two-thirds of the membership loss between 
1921 and 1933 took place at the beginning of that period, during 1921- 
1923. The 1,426,000 members lost in those three years represented
23
28.2 per cent of the 1920 total. Those three years of rapid deteriora­
tion were followed by eight years of only slow or moderate decline, 
including one year, 1927, with a small, temporary increase in member­
ship. Then, during 1932-1933, membership dropped suddenly by 11.5 
per cent, a loss of 385,000 members. Similarly, almost two-thirds of 
the total decline of the seven-year period 1957-1963 was concentrated 
in a precipitous drop in 1961.
The yearly increases in union membership were also of widely 
varying magnitudes. Membership actually increased in most (61 per 
cent) of the years covered, but these increases varied from as little 
as 44,000 to over 3,000,000. Prior to 1934 the largest increase had 
taken place in 1920 when 923,000 new members were added— an increase 
of 22.4 per cent over the previous year. Far larger than that was the 
increase realized in 1937. Membership almost doubled in that one year 
with 3,012,000 new members, or a 75.5 per cent increase. There have 
been six years since 1934 in which membership grew by more than one 
million.
There have been only a few periods of really rapid growth, but 
these have provided most of the advances in membership. Membership 
increased by a multiple of 4.6 between 1897 and 1904 with an absolute 
increase of 1,626,000 members. Membership advanced faster than the 
long-run rate between 1910 and 1913 when 711,000 new members were 
added--a 35.4 per cent increase over 1909. The next real spurt of 
growth occurred between 1916 and 1920, with an absolute increase of 
2,465,000 which almost exactly doubled the membership of 1915.
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By 1953 the ratio of membership to the labor force was at its 
apex and by 1956 the total number of union members had reached
17,490,000. The next (and last) two short-run periods listed in 
Table 2 (1957-1963 and 1964-1968) were not significant in magnitude of 
rate of change, but these are the two most recent periods and the
periods which have sparked controversy about the future of unionism.
>.
Following the new high mark for membership achieved in 1956 there was 
a seven-year period during which, with the exception of 1959 and 1962, 
membership declined in both absolute and relative strength. Although 
membership began to rise at a steady rate after 1963 the ratio of mem­
bership to nonagricultural employment continued to decline through the 
end of the period for which there is data.
Reasons for Short-run Variations in Membership Growth
For a long time there was wide acceptance of the idea that 
short-run variations in union membership are directly related to, and 
sufficiently explained by, the business cycle. John R. Commons gave 
the premier statement of this relationship: unions grow when business
conditions are good, during the expansive stage of the business cycle; 
when business activity turns down, unions suffer defeat and priorities 
shift from organization and expansion to political and economic solu­
tions to the problems encountered by labor during the recession or 
22depression. Other writers have supported this view or variants of 
22John R. Commons and Helen L. Sumner, A Documentary History 
of American Industrial Society, V, 19.
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it: Bernstein cited George E. Barnett, Horace B. Davis, Selig Perlman
and Samuel Gompers as advocates.^3
Dunlop stressed the business-cycle aspects of wartime econo­
mies and of periods of severe social unrest, which he related primar­
ily to business cycles. The expansion of union membership during 
wartime " . . .  is to be explained almost entirely by developments in 
the labor market: the rapid rise in the cost of living and the short­
age of labor supply relative to d e m a n d . D u n l o p  maintained that the 
other periods of rapid advance in union membership followed periods 
when economic conditions were particularly bad, and the increase in
union membership " . . .  represented a basic dissatisfaction with the
25
performance of the economic system and the society in general."
Those periods of social unrest which are severe enough to promote mem­
bership occur when a short-run business cycle downturn coincides with 
the bottom of the long-run, or Kondratieff cycle. A depression such 
as this, following a number of years of deteriorating conditions for 
labor, is sufficient to light the fires of fundamental discontent with
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 309, n. 5.
^John T. Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organization: A
Theoretical Framework," in Insights into Labor Issues, ed. by Richard 
A. Lester and Joseph Shister (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948),
p. 190.
-^*Ibid., p. 191. Note that Commons linked membership growth 
to the expansive phase of the business cycle, and Dunlop stressed the 
importance of the depression phase of the cycle. The two views are 
not inconsistent if, as per Davis (below), the depression creates in 
workers the desire to unionize and the beginning of the recovery 
enables them to unionize because the labor market is tighter.
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the system. Then workers seek the power to change the economic struc­
ture surrounding them.
Horace B. Davis concluded that union growth proceeds by waves 
which are not closely synchronized with those of the business cycle. 
However, he stressed conditions which may respond to the cycle. Davis 
argued that workers accumulate grievances in the period preceding mem­
bership growth, and that this is a prerequisite to membership expan­
sion. Of equal importance, the workers must be in an improved position 
in the labor market so that they have some leverage or bargaining 
power. Thus, the revival from a depression is much more conducive to 
membership growth than the depths, for then the labor market conditions
are more favorable. Davis also emphasized his belief that the direc­
tion of movement of economic indicators, e.g., indices of employment 
and prices, is more important than their absolute level in assessing 
the conditions facing labor for the purpose of explaining membership 
growth.^
Bernstein tested the business cycle theory and concluded that 
it possesses little predictive value.^7 He compared membership changes 
to the business cycle in four tests:
(1) He checked to see if the overall movement of membership was
consistent within the different short-run periods of economic
expansion or contraction.
f
^Horace B. Davis, "The Theory of Union Growth," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. LV, No. 4 (1941), 631-33.
27Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," pp. 310-13.
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(2) He compared the direction of year-to-year changes In the 
overall level of economic activity and the number of union 
members.
(3) He measured the coefficient of correlation between year-to- 
year percentage changes in membership and year-to-year per­
centage changes in the indexes of each of four business cycle 
indicators--consumer prices, employment, wholesale prices, 
and industrial production.
(4) He compared the direction of year-to-year movements in real 
membership (membership as a proportion of the civilian labor 
force) with the direction of year-to-year movements in each 
of the same four indexes of the business cycle.
Bernstein's data delineate five important recessions between 
1901 and 1948 (his study period) with no consistent behavior in mem­
bership during then. Membership rose dramatically during one of them, 
rose moderately during two of them, dropped modestly during one, and 
declined sharply during one. Seven periods of business expansion are 
included in the period 1901-1948. Membership increased sharply during 
four of these, increased modestly during one upswing, remained stable 
during one, and suffered its most serious decline of its history dur­
ing one. In other words, the relationship between membership growth 
and the major business cycle is not at all well defined.
When year-to-year changes in membership and the level of busi­
ness activity are compared, there is little correspondence even in the
28
direction of these movements, much less in the amplitude of the 
fluctuationsi
In correlating year-to-year movements in the proportion of the 
labor force which is unionized (which he called real membership) and 
contemporaneous movements in four of the best known indicators of busi­
ness activity, Bernstein used the percentage change each year for each 
series. The correlation coefficients derived are below any meaningful 
level of significance. By far the best "fit" exists between the per­
centage change in consumer prices and the percentage change in real 
membership, but even here the coefficient of correlation is only + .39., 
In fact, in 40 per cent of the years these two series moved in oppo­
site directions. The correlation coefficient between percentage 
changes in real membership and percentage changes in employment is 
+ .04, which is so low that it fails to indicate any relationship what­
soever. However, the correlation of percentage changes in the number 
of employees and in the number of union members yields a higher, 
though still not significant, correlation coefficient of + .25. In 46 
per cent of the years these two series moved in opposite directions.
The coefficient of correlation with percentage changes in wholesale 
prices was only + .23 and that with percentage changes in industrial 
production (+ .009) was even less significant.
Bernstein concluded that the individual instances of relation­
ship between the business cycle and membership are sporadic and are 
counter-balanced by contrary experiences, and at best, the cycle merely 
contributes to growth along with other factors in specific historical
29
situations. He denies the existence of a monocausal relationship
between membership and the business cycle.
Bernstein also addressed himself to the question: Why doesn't
union membership respond closely to the business cycle? He alluded to
a statement by Wesley Clair Mitchell that no activity will respond
regularly to business cycles unless man controls the activity and
man's exercise of this control is swayed by short-run economic consid-
28erations, whether he is conscious of the influence or not. Bernstein
maintained that a worker is only rarely influenced directly by short-
run economic considerations when it comes to his decision to join or
not join a union. Davis had suggested that there is a great deal of
inertia among workers that the usual business cycle is unable to 
29overcome.
Bernstein, though rejecting the monocausal influence of the 
business cycle in union membership growth, included this factor among 
others in a pluralistic explanation of short-run trends. Building on
on
Dunlop's emphasis of wars and periods of social unrest, he included 
several additional ramifications of those events which affect union 
growth. Bernstein enumerated five factors which encourage union 
growth during a time of war. The first is the increase in business
^®W. C. Mitchell, What Happens During Business Cycles. A Prog­
ress Report (New York, 1951), p. 95. Quoted in Bernstein, "The Growth 
of American Unions," p. 313.
^Davis, "The Theory of Union Growth," p. 631.
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Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organization: A Theo­
retical Framework," ibid. ^
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activity, most importantly the accompanying price rise and the higher 
cost of living. Rising prices and high levels of employment and pro­
duction are characteristic of economic mobilization for a war effort. 
As discussed above, Bernstein argued that the relationship of member­
ship to employment and production is relatively remote. However, real 
wages may depreciate rapidly enough to stir workers on to organization 
in order to lift their money wages.3  ^ This describes the situation in 
both World Wars and the Korean War, but it is not applicable to the 
Spanish-American War, which Bernstein interpreted as evidence that
39
social unrest was the cause of membership expansion during that war. ‘ 
A second factor favoring membership growth during a war is the 
enlarged role of government, both as employer and as principal con­
sumer of the product of private industry. The exigencies of war cause 
the government to seek stability in the labor force and therefore to 
seek union support for the war effort. This prompts the government to 
influence employers, especially those selling to the government, to 
avoid hostility with unions. Thus, unions find it easier to achieve 
organization goals when they deal with the government or with an 
employer who relies heavily on government sales during a war. Bern­
stein states that it is "no coincidence" that the railroad nonoperat­
ing crafts first won recognition during the period of federal control 
in World War I and lost their recognition upon the return of control
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 315.
32Ibid.
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to the private sector, or that the shipbuilding and airframe indus­
tries were unionized during the world w a r s . 33
Bernstein further contends that wartime benefits unionism 
because the government is induced to enlist unions, among other impor­
tant elements in society, in the formulation of policy and administra­
tion of matters of direct interest to them in order to be assured of 
their support in the common effort. Thus, union representatives are 
appointed to administrative boards and agencies (e.g., the War Labor 
Boards and the Wage Stabilization Board) which enhances the prestige, 
respectability and acceptability of unions in the eyes of workers, 
employers and the public.3^
In addition to the pressures government places on employers, 
which were noted above, Bernstein states that employer hostility is 
mitigated by other forces. The employer is vulnerable to the charge 
of inciting a strike at a time of national emergency and scarcities.
It is easier and simpler to pass union wage gains on to the consumer
3 3in higher prices. J
Finally, wartime is characterized by heightened social ten­
sions due to dislocations, changes in everyday life, concern and 
anxiety over the war effort, and the strain to produce as much as pos­





Of a different nature are the forces increasing union member­
ship during periods of social unrest. These factors " . . .  arise only
in the wake of a depression so severe as to call into question the
36
very foundations of society." Secondary or less severe downturns in 
business activity do not produce this effect. In the severe depres­
sions of both 1893 and 1929 the expansion of union membership began 
four years after the onslaught of the depression. The unions decline 
as the cycle descends to its trough, because their ability to bargain 
effectively is seriously reduced. The gains in membership occur only 
after the recovery has begun and labor's bargaining position is 
strengthened.
Bernstein cited three depression-born factors which spur union 
37growth. The worker and his family are heavily burdened by the unem­
ployment effects of a depression. They develop sharp grievances 
against the existing social order, and they are more willing to join 
organizations which seek to change the social order or at least thfe 
unsatisfactory economic conditions. These organizations could be 
either political or economic, but in this country they are more likely 
to choose the latter.®®
Secondly, the employer-businessman and the system he repre­
sents is discredited during an economic failure, and public sympathy
36Bernstein, "Forces Affecting the Growth of the American 
Labor Movement," p. 129. See also Dunlop, ibid., pp. 191f.
■^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," pp. 316-17.
38Ibid.
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for the employer in labor relations thus is lessened. He is less able 
to rally public opinion or government or judicial support to his cause 
in opposing union organization.
Finally, the government is more likely to take an active part 
in promoting the interests of the worker during this time of high unem­
ployment and widespread deprivation, e.g., the Erdman Act of 1898 
which outlawed yellow-dog contracts and the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1935.39
To summarize, membership has expanded in the short-run, accord­
ing to the Bernstein-Dunlop thesis, due to the consequences attendant 
to wars and very severe depressions and has been influenced by the 
quality of union leadership. The long-run forces have been the 
expanding labor force, the increasing social acceptability of union­
ism, the increasing homogeneity of the working class, and the exten­
sion of union security provisions in collective bargaining contracts. 
According to this analytical structure, the long-run trend is positive 
growth of membership. Bernstein sanguinely predicted:
If the forces we have emphasized continue at work in the future, 
unionism will grow steadily in the long run, will suffer little 
or no loss in bad times, and will expand sharply if we are so 
unfortunate as :to engage in wars or to sustain severe 
depressions."40
Bernstein apparently expected the forces to continue.
39Ibid.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 318.
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The short-run declines, and pointedly that which followed 
1954, should not be cause for despair among union supporters, accord­
ing to the Bernstein-Dunlop thesis.^ The decline in membership fol­
lowing 1954, and the continuing decline in the ratio of membership to 
nonagricultural employment is not inconsistent with the explanations
offered by Dunlop and Bernstein, and it would thereby be considered a
>■
temporary reversal. The fact that the ratio of membership to the 
labor force began to rise again after 1964 while the ratio of member­
ship to nonagricultural employment continued to decline is explained 
by declining unemployment and the continuing contraction of the agri­
cultural sector. The escalation of the Vietnam conflict coincides 
with the renascence of membership growth, thus lending some support to 
the wartime expansion thesis.
There is another school of thought, however, whose adherents 
speak of a crisis for organized labor because they do not draw the 
same conclusions as Bernstein and Taft with respect to the prospects 
for future union growth. Among the most articulate statements of the 
"crisis for labor" are those by Joseph Shister, Edward Townsend,
A O
Albert A. Blum, and Solomon Barkin.
^ S e e  also, Philip Taft,"Is There a Crisis in the Labor Move­
ment? No," pp. 11-15.
^See Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust or
Drift?" pp. 578-601; "The Outlook for Union Growth," pp. 55-62; Edward 
Townsend, "Is There a Crisis in the American Trade Union Movement?
Yes," pp. 1-9; Albert A. Blum, "Labor at the Crossroads," pp. 6-8; and 
Solomon Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 7.
35
43According to Shister, the short-run factors that stimulated 
union membership growth in the past were wars, severe depressions, and 
poor personnel policies and practices--all of which operate by giving 
rise to worker discontent. However, he argues, the advent of modern 
fiscal and monetary policies reduce the likelihood of severe depres­
sions in the future, and the personnel relations techniques of modern 
management have improved substantially.^ Thus, two of the three 
external factors responsible for growth in the past may well not be 
present in the future.
Shister views these external factors as setting limits within 
which membership growth takes place and leadership as determining the 
actual growth achievement within these constraints.^^ For Shister, 
Barkin,^ and others, ^  leadership plays a crucial role in determining
^Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," p. 56.
44Ibid., pp. 57-58. It should be emphasized that it is the 
severe depression which Shister is discounting. Recessions will 
undoubtedly occur, but these have not been sufficient in the past to 
stimulate membership growth. Barkin adds that any long-term unemploy­
ment would probably be concentrated among the old, the young, and the 
marginal worker and that these groups do not possess the bargaining 
power necessary for free collective bargaining to solve their problems. 
Therefore, he concludes, it will be political solutions that they will 
seek, not the protection of unions. (See Barkin, The Decline of the 
Labor Movement, p. 25.)
^Joseph Shister, "The Logic of Union Growth," Journal of 
Political Economy, LXI (October, 1953), 429.
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 53.
^Blum, "Labor at the Crossroads," pp. 6-8; Davis also placed 
emphasis on the importance of leadership in determining the growth of 
union membership, although he did not argue (as per Shister and Blum) 
that leadership has lost its aggressiveness. (See Davis, "The Theory
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union membership growth. Moreover, these writers point to several 
reasons why current and future leadership may not aggressively pursue 
new members.
First, the majority of union leaders are business-unionists 
and their primary incentive for organizing new members is to protect 
or enhance bargaining gains. Unless this incentive is present as, for 
example, when organized workers are confronted by nonunion competition 
in the product market, Shister maintains that it is not in the inter­
est of union leaders to make large commitments of resources to organi­
zation efforts. Shister recognizes, however, that this argument must 
be qualified in that some leaders are wedded to the social unionism 
philosophy and thus have a vital and immediate interest in promoting 
unionism. Further, the increased reliance on political channels to 
achieve the ends of organized labor has increased the incentive for 
membership expansion.^®
Second, even though there may be an incentive for expansion,
the growing complexities of union administration reduce the time
49available to devote to organizing activities. As Barkin has pointed
of Union Growth," p. 632.) Bernstein attached little importance to 
the leadership factor in the long run, but he acknowledged that par­
ticular successes of the past in organization have been largely 
attributable to the personal achievement of key individuals, e.g., 
John L. Lewis in the industrial organization drive in the late 1930s. 
(Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 317.)
A Q
^“Shister, "Unresolved Problems and New Paths for American 
Labor," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, IX (April, 1956), 448.
^Barkin, p. 57.
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out, union officers tend to gravitate to administration and the job of
organizing falls to the younger and less experienced personnel who
lack adequate training."’®
Third, to extend the boundaries of organized labor into many
of the currently unorganized areas, as for example small firms or
offices and the South, would require coordination at the federation
level. Federation leadership, however, has not been successful in
organizing a federation-wide campaign in the unorganized areas of
employment. This perhaps is due to the traditional AFL philosophy
which causes leadership to abdicate responsibility to the national 
51unions, but some observers also have charged that the current fed­
eration leadership is too old, too tired and too complacent to pro­
vide the needed leadership.^
For these reasons, the writers who predict a crisis argue that 
short-run spurts of membership growth such as have been common in the 
past, and which have been the main source of secular advance, are not 
as likely to take place in the future.
In addition to describing the lack of conditions which would 
promote membership growth in the short run, these writers also place 
considerable emphasis on secular changes in the characteristics of 
employment which they assert are creating structural barriers to labor
•^ Ibid., p. 54.
"^Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," p. 59; Blum, "Labor 
at the Crossroads," p. 7.
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union growth and therefore further reduce the likelihood of union 
e x p a n s i o n . From their point of view, the decline in membership 
after 1954, and the continuing decline in the proportion of nonagri­
cultural employment which is organized, were indicative of a state of 
crisis for the union movement. Although they do not predict the 
inexorable decline of organized labor, they argue that it will be an 
uphill fight if advances are to be made, requiring a massive effort of 
the unions and their leaders. Thus, the period following 1954 could 
well be the beginning of secular decline and not just another lull 
between short-run spurts of growth.
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide empirical tests 
of the effects on union membership of some of these secular changes in 
the composition of employment. Chapter III is devoted to a detailed 
discussion of the employment changes and the arguments of those who 
think the changes are important for union membership.
C O
-'•'Bernstein predicted that the long-run growth in the labor 
force and employment would generate secular growth in union member­
ship, and he did not consider the structural composition of employment 
growth.
CHAPTER III
BARRIERS TO THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZED LABOR
As outlined in Chapter II, the labor movement in the United 
States has experienced significant growth since the turn of the cen­
tury. Bernstein and Taft predict that the movement will continue to 
grow in the long run as the labor force and employment expand.*- How-
O
ever, other writers, whom Bernstein labeled the "saturationists," 
argue that unions have already organized the most readily organizable 
segments of the labor force--male, blue-collar employees working for 
the most part for large firms in the manufacturing, mining, construc­
tion and transportation sectors in the larger urban centers of the 
Northeast, East North Central, and far West regions. The frontiers of 
the labor movement are the sectors not so easily organized: female
employees; white-collar and service workers; employees in wholesale 
and retail trade, the service industries, government employment and 
agriculture; employees in small firms and in small towns; and workers 
in the South. Furthermore, it is argued that since employment in 
these unorganized, and supposedly unorganizable, employment sectors is
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 318; and Taft, 
"Is There a Crisis in the Labor Movement? No," pp. 11-15.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," Labor 
History, II (Spring, 1961), 131. Bernstein refers specifically to 
Daniel Bell and his article, "The Next American Labor Movement," 
Fortune. April, 1953, p. 204.
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growing faster than in the unionized sectors, the domain, of organized 
labor is shrinking. This chapter is devoted to an examination of the 
alleged barriers to union membership growth.
The Changing Sectoral Concentration of Employment
Union membership in the United States is highly concentrated 
in a few sectors. In Table 3 the employment sectors are ranked accord­
ing to the degree of union organization in 1958. The most organized 
sectors (i.e., those with above average organization ratios) were 
Transportation, Contract Construction, Mining and Quarrying, Manufac­
turing, Communications, and Public Utilities. Furthermore, these were 
the only sectors in which unionization had made substantial inroads. 
Union members constituted 63.0 per cent of all employment in these 
sectors in 1958. These sectors employed 81.7 per cent of all union 
members and 45.1 per cent of all workers in 1958.
By 1968, the aggregate membership ratio for these sectors had 
fallen to 55.2 per cent. Total union membership could increase sub­
stantially just by increasing the degree of organization in those sec­
tors which are the principal union domain. In the long run, however, 
this field of potential union members is shrinking relative to total 
nonagricultural employment. Total nonagricultural employment grew by 
32.1 per cent between 1958 and 1968 while employment in these sectors „ • 
increased by only 18.7 per cent. Thus, even if the labor movement 
could enlist all employees in the sectors where it has relative 
strength, the ratio of union membership to total employment would
TABLE 3
THE SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT 
AND UNION MEMBERSHIP: 1958-1968
Sectors
Membership 









Per Cent Change: 
1958-1968
1958 1968 1958 1968 1958 1968 Memb. Emp.
Transportation 108.2C 93.6 15.3 12.7 4.9 4.0 7.7 6.7
Contract
Construction 83.7 77.4 13.1 12.9 5.5 4.9 9.3 18.3
Mining and 
Quarrying 82.8 56.4 3.5 1.7 1.5 .9 - 45.0 - 19.3
Total Manufacturing 52.7 46.5 45.9 44.8 30.3 28.3 8.8 23.3
Communications 47.6 48.5 2.3 2.4 1.7 1.5 16.4 14.2
Public Utilities 42.4 49.6 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.0 25.1 7.1
(Sub-Total) 63.0 55.2 81.7 76.2 45.1 40.5 4.0 18.7
Services 18.2 10.3 7.0 5.5 13.4 15.8 - 11.9 56.1
Government 13.2 18.2 5.9 10.9 15.4 17.6 108.2 51.1
Federal n.a. 49.4 — 6.9 4.3 4.1 — 24.9














Per Cent Change: 
1958-1968
1958 1968 1958 1968 1958 1968 Memb. Emp.
Trade 7.9 9.9 4.8 7.1 21.1 21.0 63.4 31.0
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 4.1 1.5 .6 .3 5.0 5.0 - 51.9 34.3
(Sub-Total) 11.6 11.7 18.3 23.8 .54.9 59.5 45.2 43.1
Total: All Nonagri- 
cultural Sectors 34.8 29.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 11.5 32.1
Goods-Producing 
Sectors3 58.4 51.2 62.6 59.5 37.3 34.1 5.9 20.9
Service Sectors^ 20.7 18.1 37.4 40.5 62.7 65.9 20.9 38.7
aManufacturing; Mining and Quarrying; and Contract Construction.
transportation; Communications; Public Utilities; Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate; Services; and Government.
cMembership estimate exceeds employment estimate. See Note e, Table 7, p. 93.
Calculated from Table 7, pp. 92-93.
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eventually decline with the decline of the proportion of national 
employment found in these sectors.
To a large extent, the shift in employment concentration out­
lined above is the result of the shift in emphasis in the U.S. economy 
from goods production to services. The nonagricultural goods-producing 
sectors are Manufacturing, Construction, and Mining--all sectors with 
above average organization ratios. Changing consumer demand, improved 
technology and increased labor productivity have caused employment 
growth in the goods-producing group to be less than that for the 
aggregate service sectors--which includes Transportation; Communica­
tions; Public Utilities; Trade; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; 
Services; and Government. In 1968 the services sectors contained 65.9 
per cent of all employees but only 40.5 per cent of all union members.
The fastest employment growth has occurred in Government, spe­
cifically at the state and local levels; Services; Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate; and wholesale and retail Trade. In 1968 the sec- . 
tors Government, Services, and Trade provided 59.5 per cent of all 
jobs, but only 23.8 per cent of all the union members. The ratio of 
members to employment was consequently much lower than for the areas of 
principal union strength. In Services, only 10.3 per cent of all 
employees were union members in 1968, down from 18.2 per cent in 1958. 
Membership in Services actually declined during this period of rapid 
employment growth. The ratio in Trade had risen to 9.9 per cent by
1968. The membership ratio among Government employees has risen 
steadily since 1958, but in 1968 was still only 18.2 per cent for all
44
levels of government combined. However, the fastest growth in member­
ship among all employment sectors during this period was in Government 
and Trade, whether reckoned on the absolute or percentage change basis.
The low ratio for all levels of government combined conceals a 
much higher ratio for federal government employment (49.4 per cent in 
1968). Wortman estimates that the organization rate among postal
3
employees is even higher--approximately 84 per cent in 1960-1961. 
Organization among state and local government employees has been 
advancing rapidly (up 44.6 per cent between 1964 and 1968),^ although 
the level of organization is still low (only 8.8 per cent of employees 
in 1968). Nevertheless, the State, County and Municipal Employees 
union has been one of the fastest growing unions in recent years. It 
is the largest of all the government employee unions and the fourteenth 
largest union in the nation.
Both Bernstein and Shister have suggested reasons for recent 
union success among government employees. The factors are both
% a x  S. Wortman, Jr., "Collective Bargaining Strategies and 
Tactics in the Federal Civil Service," Labor Law Journal. XV, No. 7 
(1964). Reprinted in Critical Issues in Labor, ed. by Max S. Wortman, 
Jr. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 103.
^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Direc­
tory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States
1969. Bulletin No. 1665 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), pp. 69 and 93. (Hereinafter cited as U.S. Department of Labor, 
Directory of Unions 1969.)
5Ibid.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," 
pp. 151-52; and Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust
or Drift?" p. 583.
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institutional and market-based. At the federal level, President Ken­
nedy's Executive Order 10988 of 1962 changed the official stance of 
management in federal employment from, at best, tolerance to encourage­
ment of worker organizations.^ At the state and local levels union 
membership among government employees has benefited by the shift of 
some properties, especially in local transit, from private to public 
ownership,® as well as by lagging salaries, the narrowing of historic 
fringe-benefit differentials between private industry and government 
employment, the growing variety in public employment, the unsatisfac­
tory handling of grievances under civil service procedures, and state
9
legislative actions designed to encourage collective bargaining.
The employment and membership patterns may be summarized as 
follows: where unions have been historically strongest, the employ­
ment base is not growing as rapidly as in other sectors, so that 
future expansion of membership in those sectors is ultimately limited 
to the below-average rate of growth of employment; where employment is 
growing the fastest, unions have been historically weak. The impor­
tance of these employment shifts in the saturationist argument is 
based on the assumption that where unions have failed to make headway
^Everett M. Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United 
States," in White-collar Trade Unions, ed. by Adolf Sturmthal (Urbana, 
111.: University of Illinois Press, 1966), p. 335.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," 
pp. 151-52.
^Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust or
Drift?'.' p. 583.
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in the past, they are doomed to fail again. If unions remain weak in 
the expanding sectors, it will be difficult for organized labor to 
maintain its power and prestige. However, the greatest gains in mem­
bership since 1958 have been in the sectors where employment is grow­
ing the fastest.
For the most part the saturationists explain the industrial 
disparity in the degree of organization by resorting to other factors 
discussed below, e.g., a high concentration of male, blue-collar 
workers in the organized sectors and the greater proportion of female 
and white-collar workers in the relatively unorganized sectors. Thus, 
for these writers, the unorganized sectors are likely to remain 
unorganized because of the characteristics of employment in them.
For some writers, like Barkin, the employment shifts not only 
threaten future growth but also help explain the decline in membership 
which characterized the period following 1954.^ Barkin said: "The
major cause for attrition in union membership has been the shrinkage 
of employment in the organized industries."^ In at least one case 
that contention is intuitively plausible: total employment in Mining
and Quarrying in 1968 was less than total union membership in that 
sector in 1958, and membership attrition would seem a likely result.
It is questionable whether the employment shift is solely responsible 
for the membership reduction which actually occurred, however, for the
*®Barkin, The Decline of the labor Movement, p. 10.
11Ibid.
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membership lost was far greater than the employment reduction in both 
absolute and percentage terms. Between 1958 and 1968 membership fell 
by 280,000, or -45.0 per cent, while employment fell by 145,000 or 
-19.3 per cent.^
If union organization adapts to the shift away from the domi­
nance of manufacturing, it will inevitably be accompanied by changes
in the union movement itself. Bernstein suggested several conse-
13quences of such a shift. The balance of power within the movement 
will be more reflective of the attitudes of workers in the burgeoning 
membership areas, and labor leaders will probably reflect this shift 
of power and base. In addition, membership growth is likely to come 
quietly, not like the manufacturing breakthrough of the thirties.
The most rapidly growing areas of union membership, Government employ­
ment and Trade, have been characterized by rapid growth without major 
strikes and with little public attention.
Difficulties in Extending Organization in Smaller Communities
To be sure the correlation between the extent of unionization 
and city size is not perfect, but there are cogent reasons why, 
ceteris paribus, organization is easier and less costly in large 
cities than in small communities. Shister emphasizes what he calls 
the "proximity influence" whereby unionists serve to facilitate
12See Table 3.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," 
pp. 156-57.
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organization by serving as an example to the unorganized and also by 
giving direct support to a local organizing campaign.^ Establishing 
the first local in a community may be more costly in time and money 
than the expansion to other shops in the vicinity. It is easier to 
spread unionism if the unorganized are concentrated in the same 
locale, e.g., a metropolitan area, than if they are scattered among 
smaller communities.
Barkin asserts that small town locals tend to be neglected by 
the national office because they are usually isolated and small. ^
The benefits to union membership are not well demonstrated to poten­
tial members, in that case, and local officers may become less fer- 
vant advocates of the cause.
Organization Difficulties in Small Firms
The labor editor of Fortune wrote in 1950 that though many 
factors have contributed to the slow-down in union membership growth, 
the important point is that most large manufacturing corporations are 
unionized.^ It was argued there, and has been often repeated by 
others, that organizing the smaller business unit is more difficult
•^Shister, "The Logic of Union Growth," pp. 422-24.
15^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 37. Note: 
Barkin speaks with the authority of an insider, for he was Research 
Director for the Textile Workers Union of America for twenty-five 
years.
■^"Obstacles to Future Union Growth," Fortune. XLI (April, 
1950), 51.,
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and far more costly for the union in view of the smaller number of 
dues-payers to be gained.^
Because of the low dues return in organizing separate small 
units, unions have used short-cut techniques such as picketing, secon­
dary boycotts, or the "hot cargo" provisions of collective agreements. 
The techniques have been increasingly restricted by legislative, admin­
istrative, and judicial sanctions. For organization of these workers 
to justify the cost in money terms, and for bargaining to be success­
ful, the organization effort may need to be aimed at a larger target, »• 
such as an entire industry or region. That is a difficult undertak­
ing, especially where there is no working relationship among employees 
in different shops, or where firms are not close to each other in 
location.
Bernstein took exception to the difficulty of organizing the 
small shop.^® He pointed out that the larger anti-union employer has 
greater resources with which to combat an organization drive than a 
small employer, and he cited evidence that most representation elec­
tions won by unions have been in shops with less than 100 employees.
Organization Among Female Employees
Table 4 documents the rising share of total employment held by 
female employees as well as the lower organization rate among them.
■^See, for instance, Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Move­
ment. p. 38.




UNION MEMBERSHIP AND NONAGRICULTURAL 
EMPLOYMENT BY SEX: 1958-1968
1958 1968 Line
(Per Cent) No.
Distribution of Union Membership® Total 100.0 100.0 1
Female 18.2 19.5 2
Male 81.8 80.5 3
Distribution of Nonagricultural
Employment^ Total 100.0 100.0 4
Female 34.2 37.7 5
Ma le 65.8 62.3 6
Membership as a Percentage of
Employment0 Total 29.6 26.2 7
Female 15.8 13.6 8
Male 36.8 33.9 9
aU.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics , Direc-
tory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States
1969, Bulletin 1665 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), p. 70. These data are based on estimates which include some 
membership outside the U.S. (mostly in Canada). It is assumed here 
that the ratio of female to total membership is the same in the U.S. 
as it is in the Canadian locals of these unions.
^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hand­
book of Labor Statistics 1970. Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C.: Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1970), pp. 25-26. These are census data 
(which are a count of persons) instead of the payroll data (a count of 
jobs) which is usually used in comparing employment and membership.
The payroll data do not provide the female component prior to 1964.
This substitution introduces a definite downward bias in the ratio of 
membership to employment since the census data include larger estimates 
of both total employment and female employment than the payroll data.
cLine 7 is total union membership in the U.S. (from Table 1) 
as a percentage of census-data employment (Handbook of Labor Statistics
1970, p. 25). Line 8 is the product of line 2 and the quotient of 
lines 7 and 5. Line 9 is the product of line 3 and quotient of lines 
7 and 6.
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In 1958 female employees constituted only 34.2 per cent of all non- 
agricultural employment. That proportion rose steadily until by 1968 
female employment was 37.7 per cent of the total. At the same time, 
the proportion of union members who are women rose from 18.2 per cent 
in 1958 to 19.5 per cent in 1968. The.rate of organization among 
female employees is not as high as the rate among male employees. 
Furthermore, the organization rate among employed women declined from
15.8 per cent in 1958 to 13.6 per cent in 1968 (indicating that female 
employment increased more rapidly than female union membership), while 
the organization rate among male employees began to rise after 1964. 
The organization rate among all employees continued to decline after 
1964, indicating the stronger influence of the rapid increase in 
female employment relative to the increases in female and male 
membership.
In spite of the more rapid growth of female membership, female 
employees are much less unionized than male employees and are a 
minority in organized labor. In 1968, almost one-fourth of the 
national unions reported having no women members; over half of the 
unions were either all male or less than 10 per cent female; and women 
were a majority in only thirty unions (16 per cent of all those
reporting).19
Barkin argued that the low degree of unionization among women 
is attributable to attitudes toward employment and collective
l^U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1969. p. 70.
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bargaining that are less conducive to unionization than those held by 
men.^® Bernstein did not accept the differences in attitudes as an 
explanation for the disparate organizational ratios for men and women. 
He argued that, in the abstract, there is no basis for expecting dif-
O  I
ferent behavior in the sexes with regard to unionism. L The economic
and social forces which lead to a decision about unionization work on
both men and women employees. Women can be as militant as men.
Bernstein explained the difference in degree of organization
of men and women by attributing it to the industrial and occupational
locus of most female employment.
The difference in the membership rate . . . is to be explained 
largely by the fact that women work primarily in industries and 
occupations into which unions have not made a deep penetration, 
primarily office, sales, and services. In these areas both sexes
are relatively unorganized.22
In 1969, over 80 per cent of all women in the experienced civilian 
labor force were either white-collar workers or service workers.^3 
(See The Low Organization Rate Among White-collar Workers, below.) 
Female employment is highly concentrated in Trade, Services, and 
Government,24 and Table 3 indicates that these same sectors are the 
areas of lowest union organization. According to Bernstein, women are
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, pp. 40-41.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," 
pp. 150-51.
22 Ibid.
^U.S.. Department of Labor, Handbook 1970. p. 36.
24Ibid., p. 90.
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employed in those areas which are otherwise not well organized. The 
lack of organization is not attributable in any exceptional way to the 
female employees. Obviously, these data are not proper evidence in 
support of either hypothesis since they do not indicate which is cause 
and which is effect: Are the women less unionized because they work
in less unionized sectors, or are those sectors less organized because 
of the prominence of women among their work forces?
The thesis that female employees are not attracted to collec­
tive bargaining organizations is contradicted by the experience of 
employee associations among some professional workers. Of the profes­
sional workers, the engineers, entertainers, airline pilots, editors 
and reporters, nurses, and teachers are the most unionized. The 
largest of these organizations are those representing the nurses, 
teachers, and entertainers. Although the American Nurses Association 
and the National Education Association are not unions in name, they 
are "functional" unions by virtue of the fact that they engage in col­
lective bargaining on behalf of their members. The strength of these 
organizations obviously rests on strong support from female employees 
since women constitute such a large proportion of the work force in 
these occupational groups.
The Low Organization Rate Among White-collar Workers
The overwhelming majority of union membership in the United 
States is among blue-collar or manual workers. According to Table 5, 
the white-collar share of union membership is increasing slowly, but
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2 5it was still only 15.7 per cent of total membership in 1968. Leo
Troy estimated that service workers and agricultural workers make up
26less than 1 per cent of total membership.
Although the overall organization rate of white-collar workers 
is low there are some strong unions among white-collar employees, 
e.g., among postal employees, railway clerks, retail clerks, musi­
cians, actors, artists, airline pilots, and journalists. The Retail
Clerks International Association was the eighth largest union in the 
27U.S. in 1968. Some white-collar unions have been among the fastest 
growing unions in recent years: the Retail Clerks increased member­
ship by approximately 60 per cent between 1960 and 1968; membership in 
the American Federation of Government Employees more than quadrupled 
and membership in the American Federation of Teachers tripled during 
the same p e r i o d . T h e s e  unions, with substantial white-collar mem­
bership, were growing rapidly during a period when many of the unions 
composed predominantly of blue-collar members were declining or stag­
nant. Nevertheless, membership among white-collar employees is only a 
small fraction of the potential.
25For corroborative evidence based on a different data source 
see: Leo Troy, "Trade Union Growth in a Changing Economy," Monthly
Labor Review. XCII, No. 9 (1969), 5, Table 3.
26Ibid.




UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EMPLOYMENT FOR WHITE-COLLAR 




Distribution of Union Membership3
White-collar workers 12.2 15.7
Blue-collar workers 87.9 84.3
All occupations 100.0 100.0
Distribution of Employment 5^
White-collar workers 43.1 46.8
Blue-collar workers 36.3 36.3
All occupations 100.0 100.0
Union Membership as a Percentage of 
Employment for the Same Occupation Group
White-collar workers 8.9 9.4
Blue-collar workers 76.0 64.8
All occupations^ 31.4 27.9
aU.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Direc­
tory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, 
1969, Bulletin 1665 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), p. 70. These estimates of distribution are for total member­
ship, including some foreign members (mos tly Canadian). It is assumed 
that the same proportion prevails among the purely U.S. membership as 
for the total membership.
The blue-collar membership entry is a residual. This is justi­
fied by the work of Leo Troy (see page 54, n. 25) which shows that less 
than 1 per cent of union membership are service or agricultural workers.
^U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statisti­
cal Abstract of the United States. 91st edition (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 225. These estimates of distri­
bution of employment among the major occupational groups are based on 
payroll data. The data for 1958 are not available.
cThe estimate for white-collar workers is the product of total, 
membership as a per cent of total employment (line 9) and the quotient 
of white-collar membership as a per cent of total membership and
56
TABLE 5— Continued
white-collar employment as a per cent of total employment (line 1 
divided by line 4). The blue-collar figure is derived similarly.
^These figures are taken from Table 1 where employment is 
also based on payroll data.
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Between 1960 and 1968 white-collar union membership grew by
44.9 per cent, while total white-collar employment grew by 23.8 per 
cent. The proportion of white-collar employees who are union members 
rose from 7-6 to 8.9 per cent which is to be contrasted with the 63.4 
per cent organization rate among blue-collar workers.
In contrast to the small share of union membership held by 
white-collar employees, these workers are more numerous than blue- 
collar workers, and white-collar employment grew almost twice as 
rapidly as blue-collar employment between 1960 and 1968. The more 
rapid growth of employment among white-collar workers is attributable 
both to technological progress and the changing composition of the 
nation's output. Kassalow noted that manufacturing output nearly 
doubled in the United States between 1947 and 1963, while the number 
of manual employees in manufacturing declined and white-collar employ-
O Q
ment in manufacturing rose substantially.
The factors which have been suggested as determinants of * 
unionization among white-collar workers fall into three categories:
(1) the technological and market features of white-collar employment, 
which in turn contribute to (2) the subjective attitude of white- 
collar workers toward unionism, and (3) the position of organized 
labor with respect to extending membership among white-collar workers.
29Everett M. Kassalow, "Unionization of White-collar Workers," 
in Labor in a Changing America, ed. by William Haber (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1966), p. 160.
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Kassalow argues that white-collar work has traditionally been
less toilsome or onerous than blue-collar work and thus relatively
30less conducive to the stimulation of worker protest. In addition to 
less harsh physical working conditions he cites the easier work pace, 
less time-clock pressure, and work assignments that are both more 
interesting and more varied.31 Furthermore, white-collar workers were 
granted fringe benefits, such as paid vacations and holidays, before 
blue-collar workers, and white-collar workers have been less subject 
to layoffs.32
Several factors are cited as contributing to the alleged 
white-collar antipathy towards unionism. Kassalow argues that because 
of their proximity to management white-collar workers are more likely 
to identify with management.33 In addition, white-collar workers tend 
to be primarily and predominantly means-minded instead of concerned 
only with ends, according to Burns, which conflicts with the mode of 
operation of the typical union: where pressures are stressed more
than procedures and skills, where ends carry more weight than the 









welfare of the group instead of on the individual in the group.^ 
Kassalow adds that white-collar workers tend to be more conservative 
in their political views and in their consideration of social pro­
grams. ^  Since unionism has been a predominantly blue-collar movement 
in the United States, white-collar workers are apt to look upon the 
union as a blue-collar institution.
Barkin insisted that the traditional business-unionism with 
its emphasis on "more, now" is not sufficient to attract most white- 
collar workers. A broader vision than that of simply getting more 
money from the employer is needed. This is especially true for the 
professional employees.
The collegiate or comparable training required for most pro­
fessions has molded a keen identity among the occupational group, 
with specific responsibilities frequently formulated into codes of 
professional conduct. While these codes were designed primarily 
to fit the needs of the independent practitioner, they' have also 
been considered binding on professional employees. This attitude 
gave greater weight to professional or public obligations than to 
personal self-interest. To the independent practitioner, the 
client— whether patient, pupil, litigant, audience, or the general 
public— has highest priority, at least in theory. Economic self- 
interest must thus be advanced by raising qualifications and 
instituting systems of certification.36
This raises the question of whether professionalism is com­
patible with collective bargaining. The National Society of
Robert K. Burns, "Unionization of the White-collar Worker," 
in Readings in Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, ed. by Joseph 
Shister (Chicago: ' J. B. Lippincott Co., 1951), p. 65.
^Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
p. 362.
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, pp. 46-47.
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Professional Engineers is on record, according .to Barkin, with the 
unequivocal statement, "Professionalism and unionism are
incompatible."*^?
(
Finally, Kassalow asserts that the large female contingent 
among white-collar workers acts to inhibit unionization both because 
female workers are less prone to join unions and because male white- 
collar employees find career advancement easier due to the more rapid
OQ
turnover among female employees. °
Finally, it is argued that if substantial progress is to be 
made in organizing white-collar workers, it will necessitate a mas­
sive, coordinated, federation-level effort by the unions as well as 
innovative changes in organizing techniques.^  Traditional AFL-CIO 
philosophy assigns the responsibility for organizing to the national 
unions. Kassalow states that union leaders are not in agreement that 
such a drive is justified, and that they are preoccupied with other 
administrative problems.^®
Kassalow argues that some of these factors are changing in 
ways that may enhance unionization. The automation of office work, 
through mechanization and electronic data processing, has a disruptive 
effect on office organization and jobs, leaving clerical workers with
^ Ibid.. p. 38.
^®Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
p. 356.
Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," p. 59.
^^Kassalow, "Unionization of White-collar Workers, pp. 164-65.“
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less interesting, more repetitive work and with less unstructured time 
to socialize while on the job.^ Furthermore, office automation may 
reduce the upward mobility of some white-collar workers. Whereas for­
merly the white-collar worker could hope to advance by degrees into 
more desirable jobs, automation creates a polarization of low-grade 
and high-grade jobs with little intermediate ground.^
According to Kassalow, the traditionally assumed personal 
relationship between the clerical or professional employee and the 
employer is less realistic when large armies of these workers perform 
routinized tasks. As described by Barkin, both blue-collar and white- 
collar workers are now
. . . often huddled together in large organizations, pushed around 
by the same type of impersonal management, and subject to the whims 
and personal prejudices, the likes and dislikes, of supervision 
and faceless pressures characteristic of large-scale operations.4-3
Furthermore, management may become less inclined to regard this work 
force as a fixed expense and more inclined to institute the layoff dur­
ing periods of light work loads.^
Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States," 
pp. 356-57. Kassalow cites a study by Ida R. Hoos, "When the Computer 
Takes Over the Office," Harvard Business Review (July-August, 1960),
pp. 102-12.
^Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States." 
Kassalow cites a study by Claudine Marenco, "Psychosociological 
Incidences of Office Work Rationalization of Employee Status," which 
appeared in Trade Union Information, No. 35 (1962), published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, France.
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 44.
^Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
p. 358.
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According to Kassalow, professional workers may decide that 
collective bargaining is necessary to protect the professional stan­
dards which they set themselves. This need would arise when manage­
ment alters the job description to include menial or sub-professional 
tasks, e.g., bus-patrol and cafeteria-watch for teachers or general 
housekeeping duties for nurses, and when management does violence to
professional standards in an effort to reduce costs or to cater to
, 45
popular tastes.
Shister argues that the changing nature of white-collar 
employment is not a sufficient stimulus to induce unionization. He 
cites the working conditions of engineers in the large aerospace firms. 
These conditions fit Barkin's description and have existed since World 
War II without resulting in any appreciable unionization of these 
workers.^ Kassalow admits that if the expanding white-collar work 
force comes from the blue-collar ranks or from blue-collar families, 
the deteriorating white-collar working conditions may be seen as an 
improvement over blue-collar working conditions and thus not induce 
worker discontent. ^
~^*Ibid.. p. 354.
Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust or
Drift?" p. 582.
^Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
p. 359.
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The Low Organization Ratio in the South
As shown in Table 6, the majority of union members in the 
United States are located in the East and East North Central states.
In 1968, 47.7 per cent of all nonagricultural payrolls were found in 
those states, but they contained 56.9 per cent of all union membership. 
Only 12.9 per cent of payrolls were located in the Pacific region 
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii), but 14.9 per cent of union members were 
found there. Thus, union membership is relatively concentrated in 
these regions: the East, which includes New England and the Middle
Atlantic; the East North Central; and the Pacific. The South, on the 
other hand has a much larger share of employment than the Pacific 
region but a smaller share of union membership. Southern employment 
grew at more than twice the rate of employment in the East and East 
North Central, where the bulk of union membership is located. Despite
several organizational campaigns aimed at Southern employment, how-
*
ever, Southern unionization remains less strong than that in other 
regions. The organization rate is lower for the South than for other 
regions, as indicated in Table 6, and the Southern states are concen­
trated at the bottom of the list of all states when ranked according 
to organization ratios.^®
Ray Marshall has warned against regarding the South as uni­
formly low in its degree of organization. Kentucky is an exception to 
the rule of low organization ratios for it ranks 20th nationally in
^®U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1969. p. 76.
TABLE 6
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT 
FOR SELECTED REGIONS : 1958 AND 1968
Item and Regions 1958 1968
(Per Cent)
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Sources: Membership data are calculated from U.S., Department of
Labor Statistics, Directory of National and International 
Labor Unions in the United States, 1969, Bulletin 1665 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 76.
Employment data are calculated from U.S., Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statis­
tics 1970, Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1970), p. 94.
65
An
total membership and 18th in ratio of membership to employment.
Kentucky has a higher organization ratio than Massachusetts which is 
the state with the tenth largest total membership in the nation. Like­
wise, some Southern cities are more unionized than some industrial 
cities outside the South. In 1952, Louisville and Richmond ranked 
ahead of Scranton and Denver in the ratio of membership to employment 
in manufacturing, while Memphis and Norfolk-Portsmouth ranked ahead of 
those and also ahead of Boston, Cincinnati and Hartford."*® Some 
employment sectors are more unionized in the South than in the non- 
South, e.g., primary metals, products of petroleum and coal, transpor­
tation equipment, paper and allied products, and tobacco products.-**•
In spite of these exceptions, however, organized labor has 
made less progress in the South than in the non-South. In most employ­
ment sectors the South is less organized than the national average.
Leo Troy calculated that had the Southern portion of each industry 
been as well organized as that industry was nationwide, then membership
-*®Ray Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions 
in the South," Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting, Indus­
trial Relations Research Association (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Rela­
tions Research Association, 1961), p. 169.
-^Ray Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities: Unions'
Future or Unrecruitable?" in The Crisis in the American Trade-Union 
Movement. ed. by>Solomon Barkin and Albert A. Blum, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCL (Philadelphia: 
November, 1963), p. 69. (Hereinafter cited as "Ethnic and Economic 
Minorities.")
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in the South would have been almost 75 per cent higher than it actu­
ally was in 1953.-^
Although incomes are low in the South, they are rising; and 
the low level from which they started seems to make the gains just 
that much more impressive. Therefore, part of the usual appeal by 
unions has been blunted by these improving conditions in Southern 
employment. Furthermore, factory wages are higher than the income of 
the marginal share-cropper; and the surplus of labor on the farms
reminds the factory worker that he can be replaced, for there are
53potential strike-breakers ready to cross picket lines.
Some of the religious sects which have enjoyed minor popularity 
in the South have preached a kind of fatalism that subverts the effort 
to change personal economic conditions in this world, rather like the 
medieval Catholic Church. Pacifist groups have also enjoyed some 
popularity in the South, and these abhor all conflict, whether it be 
war or strikes. On the other hand, the Southern Baptist Conventioh 
and the Catholic Church have both publicly endorsed and encouraged 
unionization.-^
The agrarian background of most Southern workers has been 
important in shaping their attitudes toward unionism as a means of
"^Leo Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South, 
1939-1953," The Southern Economic Journal. XXIV, No. 4 (1958), 420.
-*%arshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in 




improving their circumstances of employment. This background fosters 
an individualistic approach to problems. Southern workers often view 
the control of the conditions of employment as the natural right of 
the employer.Therefore, they accept conditions and do not show the 
discontent usually necessary for successful organizing.
The civil rights question is a serious problem facing unions.
A distinction should be made between the effects of the civil rights 
movement on potential Negro union members and its effect on white 
employees. Racial problems have encumbered Southern unions since the 
Civil War, and they became particularly acute following the 1954 
school-desegregation decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. ^  In order 
to avoid the stigma of discrimination outside the South the unions 
adopted an anti-segregation policy position. Some Southern employers 
capitalized on this to defeat organizing campaigns among Southern 
w h i t e s . I t  is not possible to offer conclusive proof, however, that 
these tactics have significantly forestalled unionization where it* 
would have otherwise occurred. Marshall wrote that when workers feel 
a union is justified on economic grounds, they are not dissuaded by 
racial arguments.
55Ibid., p. 174.





Marshall surveyed the history of relations between unions and 
the civil rights movement and concluded that an uneasy alliance has
C Q
been maintained. The lack of effective machinery to enforce the 
anti-segregation policy of the AFL-CIO persuaded Negroes that the 
problem received low priority among the unions. However, Marshall 
contends that Negro leaders realize that the unions are an important 
instrumentality in the attainment of their overall goals of economic 
and political equality. The desertion of existing unions or creation 
of Negro unions would not suit their needs as well as would the 
improvement of the existing movement. Negro-labor political align­
ments have not been destroyed, for unions still support civil rights 
legislation and. Negroes still oppose right-to-work laws.**®
The power which Southern employers wield in the local commu­
nity may inhibit unionization. Assurances to workers that they cannot
be fired for union activity carry little weight with them when they
61believe the employer can do what he wishes and get away with it.
Even should the employer be brought to task for unfair labor practice 
in discharging a union sympathizer or shifting production to other, 
nonstriking plants, retributive justice is slow to be realized while 
the economic impact on the worker is immediate. Such coercion is
59Ibid.. pp. 64-67.
^9Ibid.. p. 68.
^Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in 
the South," pp. 175-76.
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difficult to prove, and it takes a lengthy investigation to substan­
tiate a case for the hearing.
In many communities, especially the smaller ones, the employers
have such influence in local affairs that they can align the local law
enforcement officers, religious leaders, news media, and politicians
62against the union. Leo Troy wrote that, although experience dif­
fers within the region, the labor injunction has been used effectively 
to thwart organizing in the South. In the absence of comprehensive 
stage legislation courts of local jurisdiction have formulated govern-
go
ment labor policy in the area. Southern politicians and newspaper 
editors have placed a great deal of faith in industrialization as the 
key to economic development of the South.^ If they feel that unions 
threaten that progress by slowing production gains, or by repulsing 
potential (anti-union) industrial employers, they attack the unions 
with all their power, which may be considerable at the local level.
Employers in the relatively competitive, high-labor-cost 
industries are likely to resist unions with special firmness. For 
example, the textile firms are highly competitive, with small profit 
margins, and tightly controlled wages. Collective bargaining has * 
limited potential in securing income improvements in such cases.
62
Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, pp. 30-31.
^Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South, 1939- 
1953," p. 417.
^Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in 
the South," p. 180.
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Marshall argued that employment in the South is relatively concen­
trated in such industries, and that this is therefore one explanation 
for the low incidence of membership in the area.*’-*
Employers may also be a positive force in union organizing, 
whether intentionally or not. Many of the new plants in the South are 
branches of firms with unionized plants in other parts of the country. 
Even if the employer in such a case is not especially desirous of hav­
ing a union in the new plant he may support the organization drive of 
the union with which he deals in his older plants on the basis that it 
is easiest to deal with the fewest number of unions possible. Also, 
if he should refuse to countenance organization of his new plant, he 
may be faced with a strike at his older plants.
It is also possible that the union can perform a useful func­
tion for the employer, and so the employer might not oppose organiza­
tion for this reason. Marshall suggested several examples: the .
regulation of competition, as in coal mining and electrical construc­
tion; the supply of skilled manpower at a contractual wage, as in con­
tract construction and with longshoremen; the insurance of employment
continuity, as with public utilities and the newspapers; .the use of
(
the union label, as with garments, the breweries, tobacco, and the 
printing trades; and the provision of a grievance mechanism in all. 
industries
^Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities," p. 69. 
Ibid.. p. 70.
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Opinion differs as to the effectiveness of the right-to-work
laws in limiting organization. Such laws exist in all Southern states
except Oklahoma, Kentucky, and Louisiana. Barkin wrote that these
laws " . . .  are a serious impediment to new organizational gains.
This conclusion is supported by the relatively lower ratio of union
election victories in the right-to-work states."^ Marshall, on the
other hand, suggested that these laws
. . . are probably designed mainly to (advertise the states' hos­
tility to unions and not to guarantee the right to work. These 
laws apparently have not had much influence on union organizing, 
but have a great symbolic significance. Labor leaders note that 
Louisiana judges and other governmental officials took a more 
favorable attitude toward unions when the latter demonstrated 
their political power by obtaining the repeal of the Louisiana 
"Right-to-Work" law in 1956. By the same token, unions in other 
states find officials more hostile to them because their polit­
ical weakness is symbolized by their inability to repeal these
laws.
Frederic Meyers has studied these laws and feels that they have h$d 
only minimal direct effect, and that in marginal situations only.
Organization in the South is easier when the organizing union 
has a strong membership base outside the South to provide financial 
support and more experienced or better trained leaders. The unions 
which are strongest in the South are strong nationally, e.g., those
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 24.
^^Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in 
the South," p. 180.
6%rederic Meyers, The Right to Work in Practice (New York: 
The Fund for the Republic, 1959), p. 46.
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in steel, autos, rubber, coal, pulp, and paper.^ The textile indus­
try, based largely in the South, has no large Northern base to support 
a Southern organizing campaign, and its organization ratio is low.
Unorganized employment in the South is scattered in small 
towns. The lack of geographic concentration of employees makes it 
more expensive for the unions. Their resources must be spread more 
thinly, and they can count on very few volunteer organizers. In gen­
eral, the unorganized workers are in smaller plants. All of this 
means that the organizing cost per new member is higher. A concerted 
campaign at the federation level might be able to finance a widespread 
attack; but, so far, jurisdictional disputes among the affiliated 
unions, and the federation philosophy of decentralized power which 
precludes federation-led organization drives, have either thwarted 
altogether or limited the effectiveness of united campaigns.7*-
Assessing the Theories of Union Membership Growth
There seems to be little argument with the Dunlop-Bernstein 
explanation of the spurts of membership growth that have occurred in 
the past. Their analysis of the influences of war and social unrest 
is well documented and apparently accepted by other students of the 
subject. This analysis dealt only with depression-born unrest, but 
the breadth of the term "social unrest" may easily encompass other
^Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities," p. 70. 
71Ibid.
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engines of unrest, such as rapid inflation or misalignment of national 
priorities.
However, there is less unanimity about the likelihood of future 
periods of rapid growth. The proponents of the saturationist theories 
argue that spontaneous self-organization, which was important in the 
past, is not as likely to occur among the groups which remain to be 
organized by the unions. These writers argue that the Southern 
workers, the white-collar and service workers, the female employees, 
the workers in the service-producing industrial sectors, and the 
workers in the small firm and in the small town are naturally less 
prone to be union members They argue that the relative shift of 
employment into these same, alien sectors is responsible for the 
decline in real membership observed since 1954.
Nor do these writers expect an effective organization campaign 
on the part of the unions to substitute for the disappearance of spon­
taneous organization. Either the unions will not be innovative enough 
to meet the challenge, or the unions will not be convinced that the 
reward is worth the effort. The latter is likely to be the case when 
the leaders of unions have limited, business-unionism goals, or when 
the cost per-member-gained is relatively high, as in the case of 
organizing small firms and firms in small towns.
Those who take a different view argue that, whether or not 
these categories of workers, have been less amenable to organization in 
the past, the conditions of their employment are already changing in 
such a way that they may more easily be converted to unionism in the
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future. On this premise Marshall, Kassalow, and Bernstein attack the 
long-run inevitability of these structural barriers to organization 
success.
Published empirical tests of the theories recited in this chap­
ter are not numerous. Several writers have cited data to support 
their arguments, but rarely have the data been subjected to tests to 
substantiate the significance of the data. Two exceptions were noted 
above: Bernstein's test for the correlation between union membership
and the short-run movements of the business cycle, and Troy's demon­
stration that the low incidence of union membership in the South in 
1939 and 1953 was not entirely attributable to the unfavorable indus­
trial mix of Southern employment.
The next chapter outlines a technique for comparing the growth 
performance of different-sized units, and it contains an explanation 
of the tests which can be applied to the membership and employment- 
characteristics data in order to assess the reliability of conclusions 
drawn from their comparison. Next, Chapter V contains the description 
and results of tests of the arguments that the relative shifts in the 
composition of employment have been responsible for the slow growth of 
union membership in recent years.
CHAPTER IV
A PROPOSAL FOR TESTING SOME OF THE EXPLANATIONS 
OF MEMBERSHIP GROWTH
The preceding chapters discussed several explanations of union 
membership growth with emphasis on what Bernstein called the "satura- 
tionist" arguments.*- The next chapter assesses some of those explana­
tions by examining the strength of organized labor and the 
characteristics of employment on an industry-by-industry basis. The 
present chapter contains a description of the test methods employed in 
the next chapter.
If the barriers described by the saturationist arguments are 
effective constraints on union membership growth, we should expect to 
find a significant correlation between the presence of these barriers 
in the various employment sectors and the growth experience of union 
membership in those sectors. In order to test the effectiveness of 
those alleged barriers, the growth of membership in each employment 
sector will be compared with changes in some of the characteristics of 
employment in the sectors. Those sectors with the greatest relative
Those arguments may be summarized in this way: the most
readily organ:* zable segments of the labor force have already been 
organized, leaving the female, nonproduction workers in small firms, 
in small towns, in the South, and in the service-producing sectors of 
the economy. Furthermore, these less easily organized groups are in 
the ascendency as a proportion of total employment.
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increase in employees who are supposedly difficult to organize should 
be found to be the sectors with the relatively least growth in union 
membership if the barriers are indeed effective constraints on member­
ship growth. The calculation of the coefficient of rank-order correla­
tion may be used as a test of the correlation between those constraints 
and below average membership growth.
The Data Used
Sources
The data used are nonagricultural union membership and employ­
ment in selected employment sectors as well as the production-worker 
and Southern components of employment in those sectors. All employ­
ment data, including the production-worker and Southern components,
o
are taken from Employment and Earnings: United States. 1909-70 and
the companion bulletin, Employment and Earnings, States and Areas, 
1939-69. These data are derived from a large sample of payroll infor­
mation supplied by employers and as such they are a count of jobs and 
not of persons. The data were grouped for this study into the follow­
ing broad sectors: Manufacturing; Mining and Quarrying; Contract
Construction; Transportation; Communications; Public Utilities; Trade
^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Employment and Earnings, United States, 1909-70, Bulletin 1312-7 * 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), passim. .
JU.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Employment and Earnings. States and Areas, 1939-69, Bulletin 1370-7 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), passim.
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(wholesale and retail); Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Services; 
and Government. The Manufacturing group is further subdivided into a 
frequently used classification comprising eight sectors, each composed 




Food and Kindred Products 20
Tobacco Manufactures 21
Clothing




Lumber and Wood Products 24
Furniture and Fixtures 25
Paper and Allied Products 26
Printing and Publishing 27
Chemicals, Petroleum, and Rubber
Chemicals 28
Petroleum and Coal Products 29
Rubber and Plastics 30




Machinery, Except Electrical 35
Electrical Equipment 36
Instruments and Related Products 38
Transportation Equipment 37
Two of the two-digit Manufacturing sectors are omitted from 
this classification--Ordnance and Accessories (SIC Code 19) and 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries (SIC Code 39)--because the dis­
tribution of membership is unclear with respect to these two sectors 
(see below).
The union membership data are taken from the estimates pro­
vided by the Directory of National and International Labor Unions in
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the United States which is published biennially by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.^ The biennial series is summarized in the,Handbook of 
Labor Statistics 1970. These membership estimates are primarily the 
result of questionnaires sent out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Respondents were first asked to estimate the distribution of member­
ship among employment sectors in 1956, but it was not until the 1958 
survey that the list of employment sectors was expanded to include 
details for the manufacturing sector. The list of employment sectors 
used in the questionnaire is the same as that outlined above, except 
that two "residual sectors" (Manufacturing--not included elsewhere and 
Nonmanufacturing--not included elsewhere) are included for those mem­
bers whose employment cannot be assigned with certainty by the offi­
cial filling out the questionnaire. These two sectors are omitted 
from the test data because of the indeterminancy they represent.
Deficiencies of the Data
The employment data are both more comprehensive and more 
detailed than the membership data. However, the employment data 
limit the selection of sectors for comparing production worker
^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Direc­
tory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, published in even
years).
■hj.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hand­
book of Labor Statistics 1970, Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C.: Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1970), pp. 335-37.
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employment and union membership. The definition of production worker 
employment used by the Bureau is not the salaried distinction fre­
quently applied to differentiate blue-collar and white-collar workers 
in manufacturing. Production worker employment, as defined by the 
Bureau, includes production workers in Mining and Manufacturing; con­
struction workers in Contract Construction; and nonsupervisory workers 
in Trade, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Transportation, Commu-
g
nications, Public Utilities, and Services. For this reason, the 
analysis of white-collar membership and employment will be restricted 
to the Manufacturing, Mining, and Construction sectors where the 
Bureau's definition of nonproduction worker is more nearly synonymous 
with the term non-blue-collar worker.
The membership data are subject to further limitation. The 
distribution of membership among sectors is based on total membership 
including members outside the United States.^ There is no way to 
segregate these foreign members by industry for the sectoral classifi­
cation desired in this study. Moreover, single-firm or local unions 
are excluded from the totals even when they are affiliated directly 
with the AFL-CIO.8
6Ibid.. p. 70, n. 1.
^These members reside mostly in Canada, but some are also in 
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the Canal Zone. The total foreign 
membership in 1968 was estimated to be 1,436,000, or 7.1 per cent of 
total reported members. See, U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of 
Unions 1969, p . 64.
Q
This was an omission of 523,000 members in 1968. See, U.S. 
Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1969. p. 65.
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More fundamental objections to the Bureau figures are raised
Q
by several writers. The reporting union official is asked to enter 
the annual average number of dues-paying members. The payment of dues, 
is used as a gauge of the active, participating membership, and this 
concept is commonly accepted. However, the precision and consistency 
of the membership figures provided by the unions is questioned. Many 
potential sources of error have been suggested. Definitions of mem­
bership vary among unions, with payment of dues being only one of sev­
eral criteria for distinguishing members from nonmember "associates." 
Persons considered to be in "good standing" but who pay no dues or 
only part of the usual annual payment are often included in the esti­
mates sent to the Bureau. Seasonal employees who pay dues only part 
of the year may be included as may be members who are sick or unemployed 
or on strike. Frequently reported, but not paying dues in full, are 
those promoted out of the bargaining unit during the year, life mem­
bers, workers recently organized, members of locals in economic diffi­
culty, apprentices, members in the armed forces, and sometimes those 
members who have retired. Some of these reported "members" falsely 
inflate the union's strength and should be omitted. In addition, some
^See Leo Troy, "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," Review of 
Economics and Statistics, February, 1965, pp. 93-113; and C. E. Fergu­
son and W. J. Stober, "Estimates of Union Membership from Reports Filed 
Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act," The Southern 
Economic Journal. XXXIII (October, 1966), 166-86; as well as the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National 
and International Labor Unions in the United States. 1963, Bulletin 
1395 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 53-55.
(Hereinafter cited as U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 
1963.)
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unions may deliberately inflate membership figures, e.g., to enhance 
their voting strength at federation conventions, or some may deflate 
the estimates to lower their per capita dues obligation.^ Some unions 
may report employees represented as members when only a portion of the 
employees working under conditions bargained for by the union are 
actually members. For these reasons, it has been suggested that the 
annual financial reports filed by unions in accordance with the Labor- 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 be used to obtain the 
memberships of reporting unions.^ Dues collections must be included 
in these reports and division of this total by the annual dues rate 
should yield reliable estimates of average dues-paying membership dur­
ing the year.
However, some of the inconsistencies reported above represent
persons who do provide some of the unions' strength, e.g., strikers
and the sick, and the Bureau argues that the division of annual dues
collections by the annual dues rate, by failing to account for these
12members, would also be a misleading figure. Therefore, the Bureau 
continues to rely on the questionnaire response from union headquarters. 
This study uses the Bureau estimates because they contain the latest 
and most refined data.
■^See Ferguson and Stober, "Estimates of Union Membership from 
Reports Filed Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act," 
pp. 184-85.
11Ibid., pp. 166-67, 182-86.
12
U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1963. pp. 54-
55.
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The questionnaire itself contains the possibility of error.
After estimating the total membership the unions are asked to estimate
the approximate percentages of membership employed in the listed
employment sectors. The frequency of round numbers such as "80 per
cent" suggests that in many cases the estimated distribution may be
only a crude guess. These groups are not defined in terms of the
Standard Industrial Classification code, although they are based on
it. Thus, for instance, a union with members in the ordnance industry
will not find that industry listed and must decide for itself whether
to place those members in Metals, Machinery and Equipment or Manufac-
13turing— Not Included Elsewhere. Because of this uncertainty both 
Manufacturing--Not Included Elsewhere and Nonirianufacturing--Not 
Included Elsewhere are excluded from the test data.
Finally, where a union fails to report its membership or to
estimate the composition of its membership by sex, occupation, etc., 
the Bureau supplies its own estimates based on other sources of infor­
mation.
The Shift-Share Technique 
The shift-share technique was developed to compare relative
growth in regional economic studies. The apparent originator was
Daniel Creamer in a study for the U.S. National Resources Planning
1 3Beginning with the 1969 survey, the questionnaire uses two- 
digit standard industrial classifications. However, the classifica­




Board in 1943. Major impetus to its use was given by Perloff, Dunn, 
and others in a large work entitled Regions, Resources and Economic
1 sGrowth which was published in 1960.
An understanding of the use of shift-share analysis begins 
with the definition of a "share." In the context of this study, the 
labor movement claims a proportion of all employment--its share of 
national employment, or its share of employment in a particular sector. 
This datum, the percentage of those employed who are unionists, is 
often cited as a measure of the strength of organized labor, and it is 
identical to the real membership measurement discussed in Chapter II.
If employment and membership grow at the same rate, the share 
will be maintained, but if employment grows more rapidly than member­
ship the share will decline. The difference between actual membership 
and the hypothetical membership that would just maintain the union 
share of employment is called the net shift in union membership (Sn, 
where the superscript n indicates "net"). The shift will be positive, 
negative, or zero as the membership share increases, decreases or 
remains the same. Although the share is expressed as a percentage or 
proportion, the shift in the share is a cardinal number of workers.
Daniel Creamer, "Shifts of Manufacturing Industries," Indus­
trial Location and National Resources, U.S. National Resources Plan­
ning Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943).
15H. S. Perloff, E. S. Dunn, E. E. Lampard, ,and R. F. Muth, 
Regions, Resources and Economic Growth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1960).
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Let Ejk represent persons employed, where the subscript 
j = 1, 2, . . . m indicates the employment sector, the subscript 
k = 1, 2 indicates union members and nonmembers respectively, and a 
period subscript (.) always indicates a subscript summed. Thus, %2l 
is union membership in sector two, and E^ is total employment (mem­
bers plus nonmembers) in sector number one. Let an asterisk (*) indi­
cate terminal year data and its absence indicate base year data. Then 
*
E  ^ - E  ^ is the total, absolute change in membership for ali sectors.
The share of national employment held by organized labor is
ill For the base year share of employment to be main-
E
the ratio
tained in the terminal year requires that membership grow at the same 
rate as employment, i.e., that actual, terminal year employment be
rE * iequal to the hypothetical membership E . The national net
shift is the difference between the actual terminal year membership 
and the hypothetical membership:
s“ = E. i  d )
n n
where, for the constant-share case, S is zero. If S is not zero,
• •
there is a shift in the share of employment held by organized labor,- 
and that shift, positive or negative, is given by the difference 
between actual membership and the membership that would just maintain 
the share. This shift is called the net shift since it can be thought 
of as the net result of two constituent shifts described below, and
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it is the national net shift because all sectors are included (the 
subscripted period represents the sum of all j sectors).
The share of national employment held by unionists in an indi­
vidual sector is the product of two contributing ratios: the propor­
tion of national employment located in that sector, and the proportion 
of that sector's employment which is organized. Symbolically,
= Ih.
E E j E
• • J • • •
A shift in the share represented on the left side of the equality (the 
net shift) can be decomposed into a shift in the intensity of organi­
zation in the sector and/or a shift ip. the sector's share of national 
employment. The decomposition is accomplished in the following manner:
n * E * / E n *  E *\
’J " "jl E.. jl " J H - j !
E . -j* E • * E • * E *
+- E., -XL _ ZL.
Jll E E ,n ej. E.
* Ei * Eii / * E * \
■ eji +  (2)
J* * * -
n i d
S. = S S
J J J
Net = Intensification + Domain
Shift Shift Shift
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When the unions' share of employment in an individual sector is 
changed it will be called an intensification shift, and when the sec­
tor's share of national employment changes it will be called a domain 
shift.
The Intensification Shift
There is an intensification shift (that part of (2) labeled S^) 
if the organization ratio within a sector changes, i.e., if the actual 
membership in sector j in the terminal year differs from the hypotheti­
cal membership which would represent membership growth at the same rate 
as employment growth in that sector. If the intensification shift is 
negative, the unions in the sector have failed to maintain their share
of employment in the sector and organized labor is thereby weakened.
*•
This failure may be attributable to any one of a number of reasons, 
such as disproportionate growth of white-collar employment, a relative 
shift of employment to the South for that employment sector, the growth 
of the female proportion of employment in that sector, or the failure 
of union leaders to pursue organization goals.
It is noteworthy that an effective union shop agreement will 
cause the intensification shift to be positive with every employment 
increase (as long as the organization ratio is less than one), and 
thus organized labor will gain strength with eqch employment increase. 
If all new employees are required to join:.the unions, the proportion 
organized must rise as the incremental ratio exceeds the previous aver­
age. At best this gain represents past success of the unions in
87
bargaining for the security agreement, and it is not the result of cur­
rent organizational efforts. By the same token, all losses of 
employee-members lowers the organization ratio.
The Domain Shift
so that the domain of the union shrinks (expands) relative to national 
employment. Even if the unions in sector j were to maintain their 
percentage share of employment in the sector (so that there is a zero 
intensification shift) there would still be a decline in their con­
tribution to the labor movement's share of national employment (a nega­
tive net shift) due to the relative decline in employment in their 
domain (sector j). This decline in the sector's share of national 
employment is called the domain shift and is the part of equation (2) 
labeled s4.
As expressed in (4) the domain shift is the difference between that 
hypothetical membership which would just maintain the union share of
which would just maintain the union share of national employment










and that hypothetical membership
The domain shift is based on relative shifts in employment 
among industries. A shift of employment out of one industry is offset 
by shifts into others.
The resultant shifts in membership do not sum to zero since the ratio 
of membership to employment varies among the industries. A  general 
shift of employment toward less highly organized industries will create 
a tendency for the national net shift to be negative.
The national intensification and domain shifts are obtained by 
summing the intensification and domain shifts for each sector. 
Symbolically,
where S* is the national intensification shift and is the national 
1 fidomain shift. °
n  • J
Of course, some of the Sj, Sj, and Sj may be positive and some
negative. The calculation by sector allows one to pinpoint those sec­
tors, and particular unions in some cases, which have contributed sig­
nificantly to the national net shift and the nature of their contribution. 
It is also possible to determine whether the intensification effect or 




AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF SOME OF THE EXPLANATIONS 
OF UNION MEMBERSHIP GROWTH
The long-run growth of organized labor was discussed in 
Chapter II, where it was shown that despite some periods of slow mem­
bership growth, and even of actual declines, the growth of the labor 
movement since the turn of the century has been impressive. Union 
membership has grown as a proportion of both the labor force and non- 
agricultural employment. The most impressive growth occurred during 
the two decades following the passage of the National Labor Relations 
Act in 1935. Following that period, however, membership began to 
decline relative to employment, initially even declining in absolute 
numbers.
Some of the proposed explanations for union membership growth 
would explain the recent relative stagnation in union membership as 
being most probably temporary in nature.*" Other students of the labor 
movement interpret this decline as the evidence of a crisis for orga­
nized labor and possibly the onset of a secular decline in the
*-See, for example, Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," 




movement's strength and influence.^ They offer explanations for the 
decline which support a secular stagnation thesis, but the explanations 
have been offered with very little empirical support. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine some of these claims in the light of empiri­
cal evidence. The shift-share technique is utilized in the first 
section to examine the hypothesis that changes in the industrial compo­
sition of employment have weakened the union movement. Next a modifi­
cation of the shift-share technique and simple rank-order correlation 
is used to assess the operational significance for membership growth 
of the relative decline of production worker employment, and the rela­
tive increase in employment in the South.
The Shift of Employment to Less Unionized Sectors
Membership and employment data by employment sector for the 
years 1958 and 1968 are presented in Table 7. The last columns pre­
sent membership as a percentage of employment. Between 1958 and 1968 
union membership rose by approximately 2,032,000 members, or by 11.5 
per cent. At the same time nonagricultural employment increased by
more than 16,310,000, or 32.1 per cent. As a consequence the propor-
>•
tion unionized fell from 34.8 to 29.4 per cent of employment.
2
See, for example, Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, 
pp. 30-52; Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust or
Drift?" pp. 578-601; "Obstacles to Future Union Growth," Fortune, 
pp. 51-54; Kassalow, "Occupational Frontiers of Trade Unionism in the 
United States," pp. 166-82; Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities: 
Unions' Future or Unrecruitable?" pp. 63-73; Solomon and Burns, 
"Unionization of White-Collar Employees: Extent, Potential and Impli­
cations," pp. 160-65; and Burns, "Unionization of the White-Collar 
Worker," pp. 56-66.
TABLE 7








(000's) (000's) (Per Cent)
1958 1968 Change 1958 1968 Change 1958 1968
Total Manufacturing 8,124 8,837 713 15,414 19,009 3,595 52.7 46.5
Food, Beverage,
and Tobacco 1,029 919 -110 1,867 1,866 -1 55.1 49.2
Clothing, Textiles
and Leather Goods 1,228 1,192 -36 2,450 2,755 305 50.1 43.3
Wood Products 775 915 140 1,540 1,763 223 50.3 51.9
Printing and
Publishing 346 375 29 873 1,065 193 39.7 35.2
Petroleum, Chemi­
cals, and Rubber 540 724 184 1,362 1,778 416 39.6 40.7
Stone, Clay, and
Glass 251 295 44 562 636 73 44.6 46.4
Metals, Machinery,
and Equipment 2, 700 3,084 384 5,166 7,108 1,943 52.3 43.4
Transportation
Equipment 1,255 1,333 78 1,595 2,039 444 78.7 65.4
Mining and
Quarrying 622 342 -280 751 606 -145 82.8 56.4
Contract
Construction 2,324 2,541 217 2,778 3,285 507 83.7 77.4
Transportation 2,712 2,503 -209 2,506 2,674 168 108.2e 93.6
Communications 409 476 67 860 982 122 47.6 48.5
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Services 1,240 1,093 -147 6,806 10,623 3,817 18.2 10.3
Government 1,035 2,155 1,120 7,839 11,845 4,006 13.2 18.2
Total: All Sectors 17,681 19,713 2,032 50,834 67,144 16,310 34.8 29.4
Sum of the More
Unionized Sectors0 


















^.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1970, Bulletin 1666 (Washing­
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 335, 337.
Calculated from U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings. United States. 
1909-70. Bulletin 1312-7 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), passim.
clncludes all Manufacturing sectors, Mining and Quarrying, Contract Construction, Transportation, Communications, 
Public Utilities.
^Includes Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Services; and Government.
Estimated membership is greater than estimated employment in Transportation. This is most probably due to a 
misallocation of membership among the sectors, although it could also result from overstated membership for the unions 
involved.
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Those sectors in which the ratio of membership to employment 
is above the average (above .348 in 1958) are aggregated and labelled 
"More Unionized Sectors," leaving the rest of the sectors in the "Less
O
Unionized Sectors." The former group includes all the sectors in 
Manufacturing, plus Mining, Construction, Transportation, Communica­
tions, and Public Utilities. Approximately 80 per cent of all union 
members were employed in these more unionized sectors in 1958, but only 
45 per cent of total employment was found in those sectors. By 1968, 
approximately 76 of all members were in those same sectors and the 
proportion of total employment found in those sectors was down to 
approximately 40 per cent. Thus, there was a relative shift of both 
employment and union membership toward the less unionized sectors.
The less unionized group includes Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate; Services; and Government.
For the ten-year period covered by Table 7, six of the seven-
4
teen sectors show net declines of union membership. The largest 
declines were in Mining and Transportation, with both losing more than 
200,000 members. These losses represent significantly different per­
centage declines, however. Membership in Mining fell by 45 per cent
O
-'This dichotomy is not strained, for the gap between the groups 
is large. The lowest percentage organized in the more unionized group 
is 35.2 per cent and the highest organization rate among the less 
unionized group is 18.2 per cent.
^The net change does not reflect the magnitude of intra­
sectoral changes, of course. Thus, the amount of detail achieved in 
the selection of sectors is crucial to the results of an empirical 
description. We have used the most detailed sectoral categorization 
permitted by the membership data.
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whereas the loss in Transportation was only 8 per cent. Membership 
declined by more than 10 per cent in four sectors: Food, Mining,
Finance, and Services. There were only two sectors in which total 
employment declined between 1958 and 1968 (Food and Mining), and in 
both of these union membership also fell.
The proportion of employees who are unionists declined in all 
those sectors which showed decreases in membership and in four addi­
tional sectors. The four sectors in which membership increased, but 
proportionately less than employment, were Printing, Metals, Transpor­
tation Equipment and Construction. The most significant decline in 
the percentage organized was in Mining (down from 82.8 to 56.4 per 
cent). There was also a noteworthy reduction in the proportion orga-
■j'
nized in Transportation Equipment (down from 78.7 to 65.4 per cent).
The most spectacular increases in union membership were in 
Government (where membership more than doubled) and in Trade (where 
it rose by 60 per cent). There were substantial increases in Metals 
and Construction. However, employment grew even more rapidly in these 
last two and the proportion organized in them declined.
Although the proportion organized increased in seven of the 
seventeen sectors, there were no noticeably large increases to paral­
lel the decreases described above.
Membership in the more unionized sectors as a group increased 
by a bare 4.0 per cent, and the organization ratio fell from 63.0 to 
55.2 per cent, due to a more rapid increase in employment. Membership 
in the less unionized group of sectors increased by 45.2 per cent but
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the proportion organized rose only slightly (from 11.6 to 11.7 per 
cent) because of the almost equally rapid increase in employment.
It is this relative shift of employment from the more unionized
sectors to the less unionized sectors which has been offered as an
explanation for the overall decline in the proportion organized. This
claim may be stated as an hypothesis to be tested empirically:
Hypothesis One: A significant cause of the overall decline in the ratio
of union membership to nonagricultural employment has 
been the relatively more rapid growth of employment in 
the less unionized sectors.
It is apparent from the last two rows in Table 7 that employ­
ment growth in the less unionized sectors far outweighed employment 
growth in the more unionized sectors, both in absolute and percentage 
terms. However, union membership growth was also much greater in the 
less unionized sectors. Shift-share analysis facilitates the compari­
son and evaluation of relative growth patterns such as this.
The domain shift (using the terminology of Chapter IV) is a 
measure of the potential impact on the overall proportion organized 
caused by shifts in employment among sectors with varying degrees of 
unionization. The net shift is the difference between the actual mem­
bership and that membership which would have just maintained the orga­
nization ratio of some former time. The net shift may be viewed as 
the result of two component shifts: the intensification shift and the 
domain shift.^ The null hypothesis for Hypothesis One is stated: the
decline in the national organization ratio is not significantly
^See equation (2), p. 85.
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affected by the relative shift of employment among the sectors. This 
null hypothesis must be rejected if the national domain shift is found 
to be a considerable contributor to the national net shift, and thus ' 
we would accept Hypothesis One.
It must be acknowledged, indeed it must be stressed, that the 
choice exercised in dividing the whole into sectors may alter the rela­
tive size of the national intensification and domain shifts, although 
it does not affect the national net shift. In general, the fewer sec­
tors or divisions used, the smaller the national domain shift and the 
larger the national intensification shift. In fact, if the whole is 
not divided at all, the domain shift is zero. This is an argument for 
making use of as many sectoral divisions as possible, which is what is 
done in this case. Nevertheless, a more detailed subdivision of sec­
tors would likely yield results different from those reported here.
Table 8 was calculated by applying the shift-share technique 
to the membership and employment data in Table 7. The first column, 
which represents the net shift, is decomposed into an intensification 
shift (column two) and a domain shift (column three). The intensifi­
cation shift represents the difference between the actual union mem­
bership in the sector and the hypothetical membership which would just 
maintain the organization ratio in the sector, given the employment 
growth'which occurred.
The sum of the intensification shifts in all sectors is the 
national intensification shift, and it is a measure of the effect on 
the national share attributable to the success or failure of unions to
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TABLE 8
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP AND NONAGRICULTURAL 








Total Manufacturing 1,894 - 1,190 704
Food, Beverage, and Tobacco - 440 109 . - 331
Clothing, Textiles, and Leather Goods - 430 189 - 241
Wood Products - 109 28 - 136
Printing and Publishing - 82 47 - 35
Petroleum, Chemicals, and Rubber 11 19 - 8
Stone, Clay, and Glass - 37 11 - 48
Metals, Machinery, and Equipment - 482 631 149
Transportation Equipment - 325 271 - 53
Mining and Quarrying - 480 160 - 320
Contract Construction - 529 207 - 322
Transportation - 1,079 391 - 688
Communications - 64 9 - 73
Public Utilities - 18 47 - 65
Trade 267 276 - 9
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate - 87 90 2
Services - 545 842 298
Government 788 591 197
Total: All Sectors - 3,641 - 1,958 - 1,683
Sum of the More Unionized Sectors3 _ 4,063 - 1,893 _ 2,171
Sum of the Less Unionized Sectors^ 422 65 488
0
Includes all Manufacturing sectors, Mining and Quarrying, 
Contract Construction, Transportation, Communications, Public 
Utilities.
^Includes Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Services; 
and Government.
Calculated from Table 7.
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maintain the percentage organized in the various sectors. If member­
ship in each sector were to grow at the same rate as employment, so 
that the organization, ratio in each sector remained unchanged, there 
would be no national intensification shift, and the national membership 
would then depend on the growth of employment in each sector.
Employment grows at different rates in the various sectors, 
and the divergence between the growth rate in each sector and the 
growth rate for the aggregate of all sectors causes the sectoral shares 
of aggregate employment to change or shift. Shares in some sectors 
rise while those in other sectors fall; and, although some shifts are 
therefore positive and some negative, the sum of the shares must still 
be unity and the sum of the shifts must therefore be zero. Even 
though the employment shifts must offset each other, with total gains 
equal to total losses, the shifts occur among sectors with differing 
degrees of unionization. Even if each sector were to realize no 
change in its organization ratio, the national organization ratio can 
change because of these shifts of employment among sectors with differ­
ent degrees of organization. The national domain shift, which is the 
sum of the domain shifts in all sectors, is an indicator of the effect 
on the national share caused by employment shifting among sectors with 
varying proportions of workers organized. Employment shifting from 
well organized industries to less well organized sectors, for example, 
reduces organized labor's share of total employment unless this move­
ment is offset by a positive intensification shift.
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According to Table 8, all three of the national shifts for 
1958-1968 are negative. If total membership had grown as rapidly as 
total employment, so that organized labor's share of employment had 
remained unchanged, the national net shift would have been zero. The 
national net shift of -3,641,000 indicates that total membership in 
1968 was just that much too low, when compared to employment in 1968, 
for the maintenance of the share that existed in 1958 (34.8 per cent).
The national intensification shift was -1,958,000, which means 
that had the unions just maintained the 1958 organization ratio in 
each employment sector, the total hypothetical membership in 1968 
would have been greater than the actual membership by 1,958,000 mem­
bers, and total membership as a percentage of total employment in 1968 
would have been 32.3 instead of 29.4 per cent. The intensification 
shift accounts for 53.7 per cent of the national net shift. The bal­
ance, -1,683,000 (or 46.2 per cent) is attributable to the domain 
shift. This is a substantial portion of the net shift. Thus Hypothe­
sis One is not contradicted by the data, and we may not deny its place 
among the possible explanations of the decline in the national organi­
zation ratio.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this result.
There was an unfavorable shift of employment from relatively highly 
unionized sectors to less unionized sectors. This is shown by the* 
large negative national domain shift. However, this movement explains 
less than half of the national net shift. The failure of membership
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ratios to be maintained in each sector was even more important in 
causing the decline of the national organization ratio.
The sectoral distribution of the shifts is of some interest.
The national organization ratio cannot increase unless membership 
grows more rapidly than national employment. As evidenced by positive 
net shifts in Table 8, there were only three sectors (Petroleum,
Trade, and Government) in which union membership grew more rapidly 
than national employment. In all three of these sectors membership 
also rose as a proportion of sector employment. Government is the only 
sector (of the seventeen included here) for which all three shifts of 
the shift-share analysis are positive. However, employment growth in 
both Petroleum and Trade was less rapid than national employment 
growth. Although the organization ratio increased in four additional 
sectors (Wood Products, Stone, Communications, and Public Utilities), 
employment in those sectors grew less rapidly than the national aggre­
gate. In other words, the increased degree of unionization in Petro­
leum, Trade, Wood Products, Stone, Communications, and Public Utilities 
was aided by below average growth in employment in these sectors.
There were only four sectors in which employment shifts were 
positive (Metals, Finance, Services, and Government). In the first 
three of these membership failed to keep pace with sectoral employment; 
although, as noted, sectoral employment advanced at an above average 
rate. However, the net shift for these sectors was also negative, 
indicating that membership failed to grow as rapidly as average 
employment.
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Production Worker Employment and Union Membership
A plausible explanation for at least part of the negative 
intensification shifts in membership is that during the period under 
consideration nonproduction worker employment rose relative to produc­
tion worker employment. For those who hold that the production worker 
is the traditional source of union membership, such a change shrinks 
the domain of the union movement relative to total employment but is 
not included in the domain shift as defined in the preceding shift- 
share analysis, showing up instead in the intensification shift.
It has been well established that most union members are pro­
duction or blue-collar workers.^ In 1968 blue-collar workers held 
approximately 84.3 per cent of all union membership cards, and white- 
collar members, though growing as a proportion of the total, still were 
less than 16 per cent of total membership. Furthermore, the estimated 
organization rate among blue-collar workers was almost seven times 
greater than the rate among white-collar workers (64.8 per cent as
O
opposed to 9.4 per cent).
Production worker employment data by sector are presented in 
Table 9. The sectors included in the table are those for which the
6See, for instance, Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, 
pp. 42-50; Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust or
Drift?" pp. 580-83; and Burns, "Unionization of the White Collar 
Worker," pp. 56-66.
^See above: Table 5, p. 55.
®See Table 5, p. 55. These estimates are aggregative totals 
for all employment sectors combined.
TABLE 9





1958 1968 Change 1958 1968
(Thousands) (Per Cent)
Total Manufacturing 11,615 13,981 2,366 75.4 73.6
Food, Beverage, and Tobacco 1,306 1,264 - 42 69.9 67.7
Clothing, Textiles, and Leather Goods 2,190 2,427 237 89.4 88.1
Wood Products 1,302 1,447 144 84.6 82.1
Printing and Publishing 563 667 104 64.5 62.6
Petroleum, Chemicals, and Rubber 905 1,163 258 66.4 65.4
Stone, Clay, and Glass 458 509 51 81.4. 80.1
Metals, Machinery, and Equipment 3,770 5,065 1,295 73.0 71.3
Transportation Equipment 1,121 1,441 321 70.3 70.7
Mining and Quarrying 611 461 - 150 81.4 76.1
Contract Construction 2,384 2,768 384 85.8 84.3
Total: These Sectors 14,610 17,210 2,600 77.1 75.2
Calculated from U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings, United States, 1909-70, Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1971), passim.
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term "production worker" is well defined and for which the source data 
are therefore comparable. Approximately 60 per cent of all union mem­
bers were employed in these ten sectors during the period covered.^
The last two columns in Table 9 show production worker employ­
ment as a percentage of total employment in each sector. The majority 
of employees in each of these sectors are production workers, and the 
proportion varies from 62.6 to 89.4 per cent of total employment. How­
ever, the ratio of production worker employment to total employment 
declined between 1958 and 1968 in each sector except Transportation 
Equipment. In most sectors both production and nonproduction worker 
employment increased, and the decline in the ratio reflected the faster 
growth of nonproduction worker employment. Both production worker 
employment and total employment declined in two sectors (Food and 
Mining); but in both the total employment decline was less than the 
production worker decline, which indicates that nonproduction worker 
employment increased in these sectors while production worker employ­
ment declined.
If union membership is related more closely to production 
worker employment than to total employment, there should be a discern­
ible correlation between production worker employment and union member­
ship among the sectors, and that relationship should be stronger than 
the relationship between membership and total employment. Even more 
importantly for the purpose at hand, we should expect to find a
^Calculated from Table 7.
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significant correlation between changes in membership and changes in 
production worker employment, *>nd this correlation should also be more 
pronounced than the correlation between changes in membership and 
total employment. Our testable hypothesis can be stated in two parts: 
Hypothesis Two
A. Union membership is directly related to production worker
employment.
B. Changes in union membership are directly related to changes
in production worker employment.
Part A of Hypothesis Two can be tested by calculating the rank- 
order correlation coefficient for the percentage organized and the per­
centage who are production workers in the ten sectors of Table 9. If 
this correlation is significant at the 10 per cent level, we will 
reject the null hypothesis (that union membership is not directly 
related to production worker employment). The correlation coefficients 
obtained are + .3576 for 1958 and + .4303 for 1968, neither of which 
is significant at the 10 per cent level for 10 observations.^-® Thus, 
the null hypothesis is not.rejected, and Part A of Hypothesis Two is 
not given strong empirical support.
Even if the concentration of union membership and production 
worker employment were closely related, that would not in itself sub­
stantiate the claim that changes in membership are directly related to 
changes in production worker employment. The null hypothesis to be
■^The table of critical values used in all correlation tests 
is that provided by Gerald J. Glasser and Robert F. Winter, "Critical 
Values of the Coefficient of Rank Correlation for Testing the Hypothe­
sis of Independence," Biometrika, XLVIII (December, 1961), 447. The 
Spearman coefficient is used for all correlation tests in this chapter.
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tested in this case is that changes in membership are not directly 
related to changes in production worker employment. Several measures 
of change may be used. The correlation coefficient for percentage 
changes in membership and production worker employment is + .5394 
which is significant at the 10 per cent level. However, the correla­
tion coefficient for percentage changes in membership and in total 
employment is larger (+ .6242), and is significant at the 5 per cent 
level. This would indicate a closer relationship between membership 
changes and total employment changes than between membership and pro­
duction worker employment changes.
When the sectors are ranked according to the change in the 
ratio of membership to total employment and according to the change in 
the ratio of production workers to total employment, the rank-order 
correlation coefficients are so low that they fail to indicate any 
relationship at all. This is true for the coefficient for ranking the 
absolute changes in the ratios (+ .0182), and for the coefficient for 
ranking the percentage changes in the ratios (+ .1636).^
These tests of the association between union membership and 
production worker employment indicate no basis for expecting member­
ship to respond more closely to production worker employment changes 
than to nonproduction worker employment changes. That is to deny the 
special dependence of union membership on production worker employment 
and consequently to deny the validity of Part B of Hypothesis Two.
11-The absolute change in the ratio is the numerical difference 
between the 1958 ratio and the 1968 ratio. The percentage change in 
the ratio is the quotient of the absolute change and the initial ratio.
If Hypothesis Two were operationally valid, the failure of 
membership to maintain its percentage of employment in these ten sec­
tors (as evidenced by negative intensification shifts) could be 
attributed to the relative decline in production:worker employment in 
the sectors. The shift-share technique can be modified to indicate the 
portion of the intensification shift which could reasonably be attributed 
to the relative change in employment from production workers to nonpro­
duction workers.
The procedure may be explained symbolically by adapting the 
notation used above. Let the first subscript, in E^ continue to denote 
the employment sector. Employment in a sector can be categorized in 
more than one way: union members and nonmembers, production workers
and nonproduction workers, etc. Let the letter "p" in the second sub­
script position indicate the production worker portion of employment, 
and let the letter "m" in that position indicate the portion of employ­
ment which belongs to unions. These classifications are nonadditive, 
of course. Thus, E m is membership in all sectors combined, E ^  is
production worker employment in the jth sector, and E. is total
J •
employment in the jth sector. The intensification shift of membership 
in sector j, using the adapted notation, is
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If union membership were primarily a function of production 
worker employment, the union share of employment in a sector could be 
decomposed into two ratios:
E • E . E .ZJB = Ji! J£
E i E 4« E 4J* JP J*
Thus the intensification shift (the shift in the share on the left of 
the equality) may be decomposed into a shift in the union share of pro­
duction worker employment in the sector and a shift resulting from a 
change in the production worker share of total employment in the sec­
tor. Symbolically:
i * E . * Ei * E.*
S. = E .  IE. E. + —IE E  ItE.
j Jm E, Jm E, jm E^ jm
Jr Jr j •
* E• * Ei
= E .  UE E + -Jm|
Jm E, jm E, v
jP jPN j-
l a  b
S = S + S.
j j J
The term labeled Sj is related to the shift sj in the same way 
that S^ is related to the net shift S? in the preceding section; and 
in this sense S^ is analogous to the intensification shift. Sj is the 
difference between actual membership and that membership which would 
have just maintained the union share of production worker employment. 
Sj would be zero if membership were to grow at the same rate as pro­
duction worker employment.
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The second element, S j, is analogous to the domain shift. If 
there is a shift in the production worker share of total employment in 
the sector,- and if membership were to vary proportionately with produc-
I.
tion worker employment, the shift Sj would be an indication of the 
effect of the change in employment patterns, from production workers 
to nonproduction workers, on membership. This much of the intensifi­
cation shift of membership could be considered to be the result of the 
shift of employment away from production workers, and if the decreasing 
production worker share is an important explanation of the slow growth 
of membership, the Sj shift should be a major component of the negative 
intensification shift of membership.
Table 10 shows the decomposition of the intensification shift
for the ten sectors included in Table 9. The sum of the S. shows the
J
change in union membership which would have taken place due to the 
shift of employment from production workers to nonproduction workers, 
provided the ratio of membership to production worker had remained the 
same in each sector. This shift (-269,000) was only 17.3 per cent of 
the total intensification shift for these ten sectors (-1,557,000).
In no single sector does the shift in the production worker share of 
employment, as evaluated by S^, account for as much as one'-half of the 
intensification shift for that sector.
It is interesting to note that only three sectors of these ten 
achieved positive intensification shifts in membership (Wood Products, 
Petroleum, and Stone), and they did so in the face of declining produc­
tion worker shares of total employment. Furthermore, the only sector
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TABLE 10
DECOMPOSITION OF THE INTENSIFICATION SHIFT [Sj] IN 
SELECTED SECTORS TO ALLOW FOR SHIFTS IN PRODUC­







Total Manufacturing - 1,190 - 1,004 186
Food, Beverage,
and Tobacco 109 77 - 33
Clothing, Textiles, 
and Leather Goods 189 169 - 20
Wood Products 28 54 - 26
Printing and
Publishing 47 35 - 13
Petroleum, Chemi­
cals, and Rubber 19 30 - 11
Stone, Clay, and 
Glass 11 16 5
Metals, Machinery,
and Equipment 631 - 543 - 88
Transportation
Equipment 271 281 9
Mining and
Quarrying 160 127 - 33
Contract
Construction 207 157 - 50
Total: All Sectors - 1,557 - 1,288 - 269
See text, pp. 108-109, for definition of the second and third 
columns (Sj and S^).
Calculated from Tables 7, 8, and 9.
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in which production worker employment rose relative to total employ­
ment was Transportation Equipment, and this was the sector with the 
second largest negative intensification shift of all ten sectors.
Thus, the statistical correlation of changes in membership and 
production worker employment by sector provides a secure basis for 
rejecting the hypothesis that membership relies more heavily on produc­
tion worker employment than other components of the work force. In 
addition, the shift-share analysis shows that the relative change in 
production worker employment cannot explain the failure of unions to 
maintain their share of total employment in these sectors. These ten 
sectors constitute a fair sample because they contain over 60 per cent 
of all union membership and over 60 per cent of all blue-collar 
workers.^
The Shift of Employment to the South
As shown in Chapter III, the percentage of those employed who 
belong to unions is greatest in the New England, Middle Atlantic, East 
North Central, and Pacific regions. Table 6 (page 64) showed that the 
rate of participation in unions in these regions is more than twice as 
great as in the South. The low rate of organization in the South has 
attracted particular attention because the South provides a substan­
tial portion (24.4 per cent in 1968) of national employment, and 
employment in the South is growing almost twice as rapidly as
1 9A^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Occupational Employment Patterns for 1960 and 1975. Bulletin 1599 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), Table 4, p. 16.
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employment in the East and East North Central regions where unions are 
stronger.
Several writers have noted the low organization rate in the
South, and the failure of various attempts by organized labor to
increase unionization in the South, and they have offered explanations
13for the lower unionization of the South.
The explanations are of two different types. Frederic Meyers 
attributed the low organization rate to the "pre-industrial" structure 
of Southern employment, i.e., the overall organization rate•in the 
South is low because employment in the South is concentrated in sectors 
which are not highly unionized in other regions either.^ According 
to this view, if the pattern of Southern employment were to become 
more similar to that of the rest of the nation, we should expect the 
organization rate in the South to approach the national average. As a 
testable hypothesis, this explanation may be stated:
Hypothesis Three: There is an inverse relationship between the South­
ern share of employment in a sector and the percent­
age organized in the sector.
Other explanations of the low incidence of unionization in the
South are based on socioeconomic features of Southern employment.
13See, for instance, Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in 
the South, 1939-1953," pp. 407-8; Barkin, The Decline of the Labor 
Movement, pp. 15, 30-32; Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities: 
Unions' Future or Unrecruitable?" p. 69. ^
•^Frederic Meyers, "The Growth of Collective Bargaining in 
Texas--A Newly Industrialized Area," (Mimeographed paper read at the 
Annual Convention of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 
1954), p. 5. Cited in Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the 
South, 1939-1953," p. 408.
113
According to this interpretation, the Southern employee is less likely 
than employees in other regions to become a union member. Our testable 
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis Four: There is an inverse relationship between the shift
of employment to the South and the growth of union 
membership.
Table 11 contains the Southern employment data for 1958 and
1968.^ The last two columns show Southern employment as a percentage
of national employment for each sector. These ratios document the rise
in the Southern share of national employment for all sectors. The
South's share of employment is especially large in Mining and in Cloth- 
16
ing, and the Southern share is especially small in Mefals, Transpor­
tation Equipment, Printing, and Public Utilities. The ratio of 
Southern to total employment is slightly higher for the group of less 
unionized sectors. However, the ratio for the more unionized sectors 
advanced faster between 1958 and 1968 than the ratio in the less 
unionized sectors. This indicates that the gain in Southern employ­
ment, relative to the rest of the nation, was proceeding at a faster 
rate in the better organized sectors than in the less organized sectors.
^The data were summed from two-digit industry data by state.
The states included in the South are the same as those included in 
Table 6 : Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia.
^The sector Clothing includes Textiles which is the real 
source of Southern concentration in this sectoral group. In 1968, 69.6 
per cent of all Textile employment was located in the South. Calcu­
lated from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employ­
ment and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-69, Bulletin 1370-7 (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), passim.
TABLE 11




TTmnl nvmont* P.Han era •
Per Cent of 
National 
Employment
1958 1968 1958- 1968 1958 1968
(000) (000) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Total Manufacturing 2,940 4,286 1,346 45.8 19.1 22.5
Food, Beverage,
arid Tobacco 458 507 49 10.7 24.5 27.2
Clothing, Textiles,
and Leather Goods 873 1,244 371 42.5 35.6 45.1
Wood Products 492 591 99 20.0 31.9 33.5
Printing and
Publishing 116 166 50 43.1 13.3 15.6
Petroleum, Chemi­
cals, and Rubber 286 406 120 41.9 21.0 22.9
Stone, Clay, and 
Glass 109 150 41 37.9 19.4 23.6
Metals, Machinery,
and Equipment 427 913 485 113.5 8.3 12.8
Transportation
Equipment 179 310 131 73.0 11.2 15.2
Mining and
Quarrying 329 282 - 47 - 14.2 43.7 46.5
Contract
Construction 744 1,020 111 37.2 26.8 31.1






Per Cent of 
National 
Employment
1958 1968 1958- 1968 1958 1968
(000) (000) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Communications 177 255 79 44.5 20.5 26.0
Public Utilities 76 108 32 42.0 12.5 16.5
Trade 2,575 3,516 942 36.6 24.0 25.0
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 509 752 243 47.7 20.2 22.2
Services 1,413 2,330 917 64.9 20.8 21.9
Government 2,025 3,107 1,082 53.4 25.8 26.2
Total: All Sectors 11,269 16,298 5,028 44.6 22.2 24.3
Sum of the More
Unionized Sectors3 4,747 6,592 1,845 38.9 20.7 24.2
Sum of the Less 
Unionized Sectors*5 6,523 9,706 3,183 48.8 23.4 24.3
Includes all Manufacturing sectors, Mining and Quarrying, Contract Construction, Trans­
portation, Communications, Public Utilities.
^Includes Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Services; and Government.
°Calculated from Table 7 and U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Employment and Earnings. States and Areas, 1939-1969, Bulletin 1370-7 (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1971), passim. Sectoral employment for the following states were calcu­
lated and then aggregated for the South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,




The greatest increases in Southern employment were in Metals, 
Transportation Equipment, Services, and Government. Southern employ­
ment more than doubled in Metals during this period and rose by at 
least 50 per cent in the other three named sectors. Mining employment 
declined in the South as well as nationally, but proportionately less 
in the South; so, the Southern share of Mining employment increased. 
Although national employment declined in the Food sector, Southern 
employment in this sector grew by 10.7 per cent.
Hypothesis Three may be tested by ranking the seventeen sec­
tors of Table 11 according to membership as a percentage of total 
employment and according to Southern employment as a percentage of 
total employment. The null hypothesis in this instance is that there 
is no observed relationship between the degree of unionization and the 
degree of concentration in the South. The coefficients of rank order 
correlation for 1958 and 1968 are small (+ .0662 and + .2500 respec­
tively) and not significant at the 10 per cent level. This is no 
basis for rejecting the null hypothesis, and so it must stand; which
leaves us with no support for Hypothesis Three.^
Leo Troy also rejected Meyer's explanation, using a different 
method. Troy calculated a "hypothetical" Southern membership for the 
years 1939 and 1953 by applying the national organization ratio for
l^The Textile industry is a marked exception to this general 
conclusion. It is highly concentrated in the South (see note 16), and 
its percentage organized is low, 19.2 per cent in 1968. The member­
ship figure is calculated from U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of 
Unions 1969. p. 73.
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each sector to the Southern employment for that sector In those years.
Dividing the actual Southern union membership for these years by this
hypothetical membership, Troy concluded that Southern membership was
approximately one-half of its potential level (54.6 per cent in 1939
18and 57.7 per cent in 1953). The same calculations, using 1968
employment and membership data, show a hypothetical Southern member-
19ship for 1968 of 4,875,000. The actual membership reported for the
on
Southern states was 2,567,000, which is 52.7 per cent of the hypo­
thetical membership. The necessary conclusion is that something other 
than the sectoral structure of Southern employment is the cause of the 
low degree of unionization in the South.
The null hypothesis for Hypothesis Four is that there is no 
observed relationship between the shift of employment to the South and 
growth of union membership. When the seventeen sectors of Table 11 are 
ranked according to the percentage change in Southern employment and 
according to the percentage change in union membership, the coefficient 
of rank correlation is so small (+ .0343) as to indicate that if a 
relationship exists, it is not operationally significant. When the 
sectors are ranked according to the change in the ratio of membership 
to total employment (which indicates a shift in the union share of
l^Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South, 1939- 
1953," p. 414.
IQ
The percentage organized data from Table 7 were applied to 
the Southern employment data of Table 11.
^calculated from U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of 
Unions 1969. Table 10, p. 76.
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sectoral employment) and according to the change in the ratio of 
Southern to national employment (which indicates a shift in the South­
ern share of national employment) the coefficient of rank correlation
21 k
is -.4118, which is significant at the 5 per cent level. This 
result enables us to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship and 
to accept Hypothesis Four.
It should be remembered that the shift of employment to the 
South, and the potentially detrimental effect of that shift for the 
national organization ratio, is only part of the national geographical 
shift of employment and, therefore, only part of the implication of 
interregional employment shifts for the national degree of unioniza­
tion. It was pointed out in Table 6 that the fastest growing region 
in the nation between 1958 and 1968 was the Pacific. The organiza­
tion ratio in this region is also well above the national average 
(32.9 per cent for the Pacific in 1958 as opposed to 27.9 for all 
regions). Thus, although the shift of employment to the South is a 
potentially limiting factor for the expansion of union membership 
(according to Hypothesis Four), the shift to the Pacific region is an 
offsetting factor.
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has provided empirical bases for accepting or 
rejecting some of the arguments advanced by various writers to explain
21By the "change in the ratio" is meant the numerical differ­
ence between the percentage organized or employed in the South in 1958 
and the percentage organized or employed in the South in 1968.
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the failure of union membership to maintain its percentage of nonagri- 
cultural employment.
According to the shift-share analysis of membership and employ­
ment, the sectoral shifts of employment were unfavorable to the growth 
of the national organization ratio; but, these shifts were less impor­
tant for the relative decline of national membership than the failure 
of unions to maintain the proportion organized in each sector. The 
correlation of production worker employment and membership growth 
indicated that membership is no more responsive to production worker 
employment changes than to changes in total employment (production 
worker and nonproduction worker employment). The shift-share analysis 
of membership and production worker employment indicated that the fail­
ure of membership ratios to be maintained in the various sectors was 
only minimally due to the more rapid growth of nonproduction worker 
employment in those sectors. The general conclusion was that the 
shift of employment from production worker to nonproduction worker has 
been a relatively minor factor in the decline of the national organiza­
tion ratio.
However, the shift of employment to the South was shown to be 
inversely related to the growth of unionization among the sectors. 
Accordingly, the continued rise in the Southern share of employment 
is a potential threat to the maintenance of the national ratio of 
union membership to nonagricultural employment. It must be remembered, 
however, that there has been a contemporaneous shift of employment to 
the Pacific region where unionization is more secure, and this mitigates
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the net effect of geographical employment shifts on the national orga­
nization ratio. Thus, on balance, the geographical shifts of employ­
ment cannot be said to be unequivocably detrimental to the national 
organization ratio.
These results cast doubt on the validity of some of the "satu- 
rationist" claims. Other claims of the saturationists remain to be 
tested, e.g., the detrimental effects on the organization ratio of the 
relative rise in female employment and the shift to smaller communi­
ties, or the lack of dynamism in the organized labor movement. Accord­
ing to the results in this chapter, however, the shift of employment 
from traditionally more highly unionized sectors to less unionized 
sectors, the relatively more rapid increase of the nonproduction 
worker, and the geographical shift of employment away from the East 
and East North Central regions are not sufficient bases for predicting 
the continued decline of the ratio of membership to employment for the 
nation as a whole.
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